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Abstract 
In “A Narrow Representationalist Account of Qualitative Content” and 
Contemporary Philosophy of Mind, Georges Rey challenges the tradition of 
combining externalism and representationalism about mental states. Specifically, his 
challenge takes the form of an internalist representationalist account of states with 
qualitative content. I examine his account, and find it problematic on the grounds that 
it fails to appropriately account for the substantiality and determinacy of qualitative 
content. However, I propose a solution to this problem in the form of an alternative 
view. This view compromises several aspects of Rey’s view, most importantly in 
virtue of being a weak externalist position rather than internalist one. Yet, in keeping 
with Rey’s project, this alternative view challenges the traditional combination of 
representationalism and externalism. It is a view on which mental states with 
qualitative contents are only indirectly individuated by elements in the external world. 
Mental states are not, as on a standard representationalist account, individuated by 
elements in the external world that they represent. While I conclude that Rey’s view 
is incorrect, I salvage his project. 
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Introduction 
This thesis explores Georges Rey’s internalist representationalist account of 
states with qualitative content, as presented in his “A Narrow Representationalist 
Account of Qualitative Content” and his Contemporary Philosophy of Mind. Rey’s is 
an unusual view, combining internalism and representationalism in the cases of 
perceptual experiences and phenomenal states. This combination of views seems able 
to satisfy a number of intuitions, especially about perceptual experiences. In this 
thesis I consider whether Rey’s internalism is a viable position given his commitment 
to representationalism (and given certain other features of his view). While there are 
advantages to Rey’s position, I eventually conclude that his account is not viable as it 
stands. I offer a new position, a modification of Rey’s, which is more satisfactory. 
This modification provides an alternative to the standard representationalist 
externalist view, as Rey intends his position to be. In this introduction I discuss the 
different types of mental states under consideration, introduce internalism and 
representationalism (and their opposing view points), and explain the significance of 
Rey’s view. I then give an overview of the structure of the thesis and the contents of 
each chapter. 
Before looking at Rey’s view it is essential to understand the types of mental 
states that it concerns. We undergo a number of different types of mental states, about 
which we have different intuitions. Rey’s theory concerns states with qualitative 
content—perceptual experiences and phenomenal states—and his theory must be 
understood within the context of a tradition typically concerned with propositional 
attitudes. I discuss these three types of states in reverse order. First, there are the 
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propositional attitudes, states such as beliefs, desires, hopes, fears and so forth that 
have propositions as their contents. Consider my belief that today is Tuesday. When I 
have this belief I am standing in a believing relation to the proposition that today is 
Tuesday. Beliefs such as this, as well as other propositional attitudes, appear to be 
representational, in that they seem to represent the world as being a certain way. 
These stand in contrast to mental states of a second type, the phenomenal states, 
which do not appear to have such representational content. While it can be argued 
otherwise, it seems natural to say that a tickle in one’s throat does not represent 
anything, but simply tickles. The phenomenal states have a content that seems, rather, 
to consist in a phenomenal feel or qualitative content, meaning that it feels like 
something to have them. By contrast it is not clear that the propositional attitudes 
have phenomenal feel. As such the contents of propositional attitudes and 
phenomenal states seem to be very different. A third group of states, the perceptual 
experiences, such as my experience as of the redness of a strawberry, appear both to 
be representational and to have qualitative content. It is like something to experience 
the redness as of a strawberry, and such an experience seems to represent this redness. 
(I say “as of” rather than “of” redness, because one could have such an experience in 
a non-veridical case. One might mistakenly perceive an orange tomato as red; in such 
a case the experience is as of redness.) 
A representationalist about a given type of mental state, say, a perceptual 
experience, holds that all of the content of a mental state of that type is 
representational content. Someone who holds the non-representationalist view about a 
given type of mental state believes that at least some of the content of a state of this 
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type is not representational. Representationalism is a natural view to hold about 
propositional attitudes, but unnatural in the case of phenomenal states (as they seem 
not to have representational content at all) and questionably natural for perceptual 
experiences. 
Not only do we have different intuitions about the different categories of 
mental states in terms of whether such states have representational content, qualitative 
content or both, but we also have different intuitions about what individuates each 
type of state within these categories. Externalism holds that the content a mental state 
has depends on some elements of the external world to make it the type of content 
that it is, where “external world” could mean the world beyond an individual’s central 
nervous system, body or mind (this issue is raised in Chapter 1). In such a case 
content is said to be “individuation-dependent” on elements of the external world. 
Content that is individuated this way is “wide” and is said to be individuated 
“widely”. The contrasting view is internalism, which maintains that the individuation 
of mental content does not depend on anything in the external world. Depending on 
the way “external world” is defined, different theorists place different constraints on 
what constitute elements usable for internalist individuation. Some think internalist 
individuation can be dependent on any factors from the skin inwards, while others 
limit the individuating factors to the head or the brain and nervous system—or to 
factors in the mind. For an internalist, content is said to be “narrow” and is 
individuated “narrowly”. 
In the case of propositional attitudes, at least some of the time it seems natural 
to say that each propositional attitude has content of the kind it has because of 
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features of the external environment—i.e. that they are individuation-dependent on 
such features. One reason for supposing so is that our thoughts and other 
propositional attitudes seem to be essentially connected to elements of the external 
world. When I think that water is wet, the kind of thought I have seems to depend 
somehow on something to do with the presence of water in the world I inhabit. If I 
have never encountered water and none of my ancestors have (or if there is simply no 
water in the world I inhabit), it does not seem that I can have a thought that is 
genuinely about water. This appears true even if I were to have a thought that was 
otherwise identical to the thought about water I have in the actual world. However, 
phenomenal states do not seem to be individuation-dependent on the environment in 
this way. Instead, internalism seems a more plausible view. When I stub my toe on 
the step this causes me pain. Yet it seems possible that I could be dreaming and the 
step might not exist, but that my pain could be real and of the same type as if the step 
were real. It does not seem that what is in the external world actually matters for this 
pain to feel the way it does, and hence to have the qualitative content it does. The 
perceptual experiences are a less clear case. One might think that they are narrow or 
that they are wide. Consider the example of the experience as of the redness of a 
strawberry. There are reasons to think the contents of a state such as this might be 
individuated by elements in the external world, in this case, strawberries and redness. 
Assuming that their contents are representational, their individuation might be 
dependent on the existence of those things they represent, which suggests that 
externalism is appropriate for them. However, it seems that they could feel the way 
they do regardless of any possible changes in the environment. Perhaps one wants to 
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say that my experience as of the redness of a strawberry is the same type of 
experience whether or not redness and strawberries are currently present to me, have 
ever impressed themselves on me in the past, or even exist at all. This would support 
internalism. 
There are a variety of different possibilities of combining representationalism 
or the non-representationalist view with internalism or externalism, for a given type 
of mental state. It is standard to combine representationalism with externalism. By 
contrast, internalism seems to cohere better with the non-representationalist view. If 
one is a representationalist externalist about some type of mental state, one believes 
that the content of mental states of that type is determined by some factors in the 
external environment, and that the content is also representative of something. There 
are various types of externalist representationalist view, but such positions generally 
create explicit ties between externalism and representationalism. An externalist 
usually holds that a mental state will come to have the content it does due to some 
kind of interaction with the external world. On a simplified view, one could hold that 
some mental state, X, has content, φ, due to interacting causally with φs in the world 
and that it also represents φs (this the heart of Dretske’s and Fodor’s views, among 
many others)1. This leaves room for a variety of positions that explain representation 
and individuation in a connected way. 
 Anyone choosing to hold an internalist view must address the difficult 
question of what in fact is able to individuate mental states and allows them to have 
the substantial, determinate content that they have. In terms of individuation 
                                                
1See e.g. Dretske, Fred. Naturalizing the Mind. MIT Press: 1995, and Fodor, Jerry. 
Psychosemantics, MIT Press: 1987. 
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conditions, an internalist is limited, on the most permissive view, to the elements 
found within the body. Depending on the type of internalist, this may be further 
limited, perhaps as far as to elements within the mind. If the states in question 
represent something, but represent something in the external world, then the elements 
represented are not able to play any part in individuation. Yet this is problematic. It 
seems that representational content must be individuated in a way connected to what 
is represented in order to qualify as representational content. In the case of perceptual 
experiences, if they are representational at all, one might think that they represent 
elements in the external world. The experience as of redness could represent redness, 
for example. However, on an internalist representationalist view it is hard to see how 
such a state could come to have that content. Instead, prima facie, internalism appears 
to cohere better with the non-representationalist view (at least given that 
representation is generally representation of something in the external world). 
Phenomenal states such as pains and tingles are paradigmatic states for someone 
advocating an internalist, non-representationalist account. While these considerations 
do not show that internalism and the non-representationalist view have to be held in 
conjunction with one another, they do indicate that it makes sense to hold these views 
in conjunction. 
Rey’s position combines internalism and representationalism in the case of 
states with qualitative content. For him, perceptual experiences are the central type of 
mental state. Here, we have both internalist intuitions and representationalist ones, in 
each case motivated by arguments and thought experiments. Rey endeavours to show 
that we can satisfy both sets of intuitions, challenging the traditional connection 
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between representationalism and externalism. Admittedly, representationalist 
internalism appears to be an unsatisfying view as far as phenomenal states are 
concerned, because of the inclination to believe that pains and the like do not actually 
represent anything at all. However, it is an interesting view because it emphasises the 
difficult case of perceptual experiences, and yet more so because it presents a 
possibility beyond that of standard representationalist externalism. 
Rey maintains that the individuation of states with qualitative content is in 
terms of the functional role of these states within our mental processes (i.e. what it is 
their job to do) and that they represent certain properties, such as reddishness and 
painfulness. However, his view is novel in that he thinks that the properties that states 
with qualitative content represent do not in fact exist. As he takes these states to 
represent phenomenal properties, this makes him an eliminativist about such 
properties. Whereas the property of redness, a property instantiated in strawberries, 
blood and other real entities, might exist, the phenomenal property of reddishness, a 
property concerned with the way it feels to experience redness, does not. States with 
qualitative content do not obtain their content from the entities that they represent, but 
rather from the role that they perform. This makes Rey’s view dramatically different 
from that of representationalist externalists. The position captures the intuition that 
perceptual experiences are about something, which is to say that they have some 
representational content, while also capturing internalist intuitions concerning them. 
However, the view achieves this at the expense of capitulating to eliminativism about 
phenomenal properties. 
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In Chapter 1, I introduce representationalism and internalism/externalism in 
greater detail, and present arguments for various views. I note the strengths of 
arguments for internalism as a position about states with qualitative content. Here I 
present arguments for and against representationalism; I do not take a stand on this 
position, but assess Rey’s internalism on the supposition that representationalism is 
true. These various views are introduced with reference to the work of Hilary Putnam, 
Ned Block and others. I take it that the representationalist aspect of Rey’s view is the 
most fundamental, and this is central to my examination of alternatives and 
modifications to his view. Chapter 2 presents Rey’s view about qualitative content in 
detail, looking at the arguments for the view and also more closely examining the 
view as a contrast to the representationalist externalist position. Then, in Chapter 3, I 
provide the tools necessary for an analysis of Rey’s view, exploring alternatives to it. 
These include: an alternative internalist view, that of Terence Horgan, John Tienson 
and George Graham ; and several externalist possibilities, in particular weak 
externalism, as advocated by both Cynthia Macdonald and Colin McGinn. Presenting 
the weak externalist view provides necessary background to the argument made 
against Rey in Chapter 4. This chapter argues that, as it stands, Rey’s view is unable 
to account for the determinate and substantial nature of qualitative content. It then 
considers the possibility of combining some elements of Rey’s view (including his 
representationalism) with weak externalism, into a new position. I conclude that 
while this is a viable possibility, it only discharges some of the reasons one would 
wish to be a representationalist internalist. Even so, it does present an alternative to 
the standard representationalist externalist views. 
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Chapter 1: Internalism and Representationalism 
 The position that Georges Rey develops in “A Narrow Representationalist 
Account of Qualitative Experience” is a type of internalist representationalism. This 
view, and specifically the viability of holding internalism given representationalism, 
will be the focus of this thesis. However, before Rey’s position can be explored, 
internalism and the opposing view, externalism, must first be explicated, as must 
representationalism. In the present chapter I give motivations for adopting an 
internalist position, and arguments for and against adopting a representationalist 
position. This thesis will assess Rey’s internalism given the assumption that 
representationalism is correct, though I do not argue that it is. I take Rey’s view to be 
most essentially a representationalist view, hence critique and modifications are 
addressed primarily to the internalist aspect of his view. 
1.1 An Introduction to the Internalism/Externalism Debate 
To understand arguments for internalism about states with qualitative content, 
one must first understand the wider internalism/externalism debate. This section 
begins with Hilary Putnam’s original twin earth thought experiment, which 
specifically concerns externalism about linguistic natural kind terms. I show how the 
claims can be extended to certain mental states as well. Then I begin to demonstrate 
how the issue involves further mental states. 
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Putnam started the internalism/externalism debate with his 1975 paper “The 
Meaning of ‘Meaning’”.2 He provided a thought experiment that motivates 
externalism about natural kind terms, terms such as “star”, “dog” or “water”. Let us 
turn to Putnam’s original experiment. Imagine a world that is phenomenologically 
identical in every detail to earth (meaning that as far as appearances are concerned it 
is identical). This planet, call it “twin earth”, is also physically identical to earth in 
every detail except that wherever there is water on earth, on twin earth there is some 
other substance, call it “twater”. This substance has all of the same phenomenological 
properties as water, but it has a complicated molecular formula that we can abbreviate 
to XYZ. It is tasteless, odourless and colourless, fills the oceans, rivers and lakes, the 
residents drink it, bathe in it and refer to it with a word that sounds like “water”. The 
histories and counterfactual states of earth and twin earth are also type-identical. 
(Entities are type-identical if and only if they are distinct instantiations of the same 
types, like two forks made on the same assembly line.) On twin earth, I have a twin 
who is physically and phenomenologically type-identical to me. (Note that this cannot 
be quite true, of course, since, for every molecule of water I have, she has a molecule 
of twater. Hereafter I will ignore the awkward fact about the difference between my 
twin’s body and mine and talk as though our bodies are type-identical. If Putnam had 
picked another example that did not involve something found in our bodies, such as 
gold and twin gold, he could have made the externalist claim without such a 
complication. My twin and I could be physically identical though she is in a world 
                                                
2 Putnam, Hilary. “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’”, Mind, Language and Reality, vol. 2, 
Cambridge University Press: 1975, pp. 215-71. 
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containing twin gold rather than gold.) I shall speak as though my twin and I really 
are physically as well as phenomenologically type-identical. 
Suppose my twin and I each utter words which sound as do the earth English 
words “water is wet”. It seems that despite the physical and phenomenological 
sameness of my twin and me, the words we utter mean different things. When she 
says words sounding like “water is wet” it seems that she is talking about the stuff in 
her environment that she calls “water”, i.e. the twater that she has grown up around. 
Likewise when I use the word that sounds like “water” I seem to be talking about the 
stuff in my environment, real water. Moreover, it seems that they have different 
meanings: hers means twater and mine means water. Because we are type-identical, 
the difference in the environment is making these meanings different. It seems 
therefore that we should be externalists about the meanings of natural kind terms. 
Putnam comes to this conclusion and is consequently an externalist about natural-
kind terms (though he does not extend this conclusion to psychological states). 
Tyler Burge points out that externalism, which Putnam claims is true about 
the meanings of natural kind terms, also appears to be true for propositional attitudes 
whose expression involves natural kind terms.3 This is a natural extension of 
Putnam’s claims, because, so long as we are being sincere, our use of language 
expresses our beliefs. When one sincerely makes the claim “water is wet”, one 
expresses one’s belief. One chooses one’s words because they have the meanings 
they do, so that what one means (if one is being sincere) is what one believes. In other 
instances we express hopes, desires, fears and so forth, all of which can be expressed 
                                                
3 This can be seen in: Burge, Tyler, “Individualism and the Mental”, Midwest Studies in 
Philosophy 4, University of Minnesota Press: 1979, pp. 73-121, and in other of his writings. 
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with language. It seems that when my twin and I make different claims when using 
words that sound the same (and are written the same, used syntactically the same way 
and so forth), that we have different thoughts. Since we are phenomenologically and 
physically type-identical, this shows that some element of the environment has an 
individuative role.  
My twin and I can each have a belief that would be expressed by words 
sounding like “water is wet”. However my twin’s belief is about twater, whereas my 
belief is about water; a twater-type belief as opposed to a water-type belief. We can 
see that they are distinct types of beliefs by noting that they are made true by different 
states of the world, giving them different truth conditions. Her belief expressed by 
words sounding like “water is wet” is true if and only if twater is wet, whereas my 
belief that would be expressed with those words is true if and only if water is wet. 
(This is not to be confused with externalist individuation: that has to do with elements 
of the external world individuating the type of belief a belief is, whereas here we are 
merely noting that we can tell that my belief and my twin’s are different because they 
have different truth conditions.) The experiment does not make clear what precise 
factors in the environment make for content-individuation, and externalists elaborate 
on this in a number of different ways, but it does seem to show that something 
external to the individual must be involved in individuation. Notice that, perhaps 
counter-intuitively, we can discover something concerning what type of belief we 
have by investigating elements of the world: we can discover, for example, that my 
belief and my twin’s are different. It must also be noted that the experiment depends 
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on intuition in order to work. We must intuit that my thought and my twin’s have 
different contents. However, this intuition seems to be a natural one. 
The twin earth example shows how something in the external world, 
specifically the constitution of water, can be relevant to the individuation of the 
content of a mental state. However, this raises the interesting question of what 
actually constitutes internalist versus externalist individuation. This issue evokes the 
difficult problem of identifying the line that demarcates self from external world: the 
internalism/externalism concern is about whether what matters for my mental states 
to be the ones they are is something within me, or something external to me. Various 
possibilities exist. One might be to limit internalist individuation to individuation in 
terms of elements within the brain, perhaps working on the intuition that my brain is 
where my mental states are located (or on the theory that I am my brain, and 
everything else is external to me). However, it may seem to be difficult and also 
arbitrary to distinguish between the brain and other elements of the central nervous 
system. Rey’s position is that internalist individuation can involve the brain and 
central nervous system.4 However, again there is a somewhat hazy line between the 
central nervous system and other elements of the body: one could hold that anything 
within an individual’s body is available to internalist individuation. However, one can 
also argue for a much stricter understanding of internalism. When one has, say, a 
thought about one’s toe, this involves two entities, the thinker and the toe. This 
suggests that thoughts about one’s toes should be considered externalistically 
individuated. Along this line of reasoning, one might be tempted to say that 
                                                
4 Rey, Georges, “A Narrow Representationalist Account of Qualitative Experience,” Nous, 
Vol. 32, Supplement: Language Mind and Ontology (1998): 435-457, p. 436.  
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internalism involves individuation only by entities within the mind (given some 
suitable definition of the mind). The issue of more precisely delineating between what 
constitutes the internal as opposed to the external is complicated, and I do not intend 
to enter debate on the subject. The following is intended to apply regardless of 
whether one understands the stance of internalism in relation to the brain alone, the 
body as a whole, or perhaps the mind alone. 
The twin earth example as presented above is specific to propositional 
attitudes whose expression involves terms for natural kinds. However, one can be an 
externalist about various different types of mental states. Rey’s view is specifically an 
internalism about states with qualitative content, and I will turn to the issue of the 
individuation of such states in Section 1.2. Before this it should be noted that one can 
be an externalist about other kinds of propositional attitudes, not merely ones 
expressed using natural kind terms. Burge gives some alternative thought experiments 
designed to demonstrate externalism about socially defined terms such as “arthritis” 
and “contract”, and the propositional attitudes that are expressed by using them.5  
In Burge’s arthritis thought experiment, we are to imagine a man on earth who 
suffers from the arthritis condition (where the term “arthritis” is used by the 
community of speakers to which he belongs to refer to a disease that involves 
inflammation of the joints only). When he suffers from an inflammation of his thigh 
muscle he believes that his arthritis has spread to his thigh. Now imagine the 
phenomenological and physical twin of this man in a world very much like our own. 
The only differences are that on this twin planet the word sounding like “arthritis” is 
                                                
5 Burge, pp. 77-82. 
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used to refer to inflammations of the muscles as well as the joints, and all the 
differences that follow from this ensue, such as differences in the entries in 
dictionaries and doctors making different diagnoses. However, the man and his twin 
have had phenomenologically identical experiences; they have never read the 
definition of the words sounding like “arthritis” or heard one from a doctor, and so 
forth. Burge argues that when the man and his twin both hold a belief that would be 
expressed with words sounding like “I have arthritis in my thigh”, they have beliefs 
of different types. The earth man has an arthritis type belief and his twin has a twin-
arthritis type belief.6 This fits with the intuition that the earth man is wrong about 
having arthritis in his thigh, while his twin is right about having in his own thigh what 
he describes with the identical-sounding word, even though the physical conditions of 
the two men are type-identical. (Note that there is a necessary assumption here that 
the term sounding like “arthritis” picks out a category of ailments that one could put 
different membership requirements on, making it a socially defined term.) 
Before turning to the case of states with qualitative content, and arguments for 
internalism about them, it should be pointed out that there are many different ways to 
be internalist or externalist. For example, there are a number of possibilities as to 
what individuates different mental states. In the case of internalism these include the 
functional role of a state and phenomenal properties (understood as properties of 
mental states). In the case of externalism they include such possibilities as what a 
mental state has standardly referred to and what it is the evolutionary role of the state 
to refer to. There are also different strengths of externalist view. One can be a 
                                                
6 Ibid., p. 78. 
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“strong” externalist or a “weak” externalist of some type. A strong externalist holds 
that states must be individuated directly with regard to elements in an individual’s 
actual environment. A weak externalist may hold that the individuation of such a state 
must merely be dependent on elements in the environment. Weak externalists can 
claim that states with narrow content exist. However, the existence of these states 
actually requires the existence of other states that do get their content from the 
external world. Weak externalism will become important as it presents a compromise 
I argue could save Rey’s position from other problems. Weak externalism will be 
discussed extensively in Chapter 3 and in addressing Rey’s position in Chapter 4.  
1.2 Arguments for Internalism 
The mental content version of Putnam’s twin earth thought experiment makes 
a relatively convincing case for externalism in the case of the propositional attitudes, 
at least for those involving natural kind concepts. More work needs to be done if the 
conclusion is to be extended to perceptual experiences and phenomenal states. Ned 
Block’s inverted earth case shows how a parallel case for perceptual experiences 
would run.7 Imagine a twin earth that is type-identical to our own, except that the 
colours are inverted. There the grass is red, the sky is yellow and the sun is blue. The 
language is also inverted, so the inhabitants use the word “green” to describe their 
grass, despite the fact that their grass is red. As on twin earth, on inverted earth I have 
a twin. For the experiment to work, it must not be possible for my twin on inverted 
earth to tell with the naked eye that the colours are inverted relative to those on earth. 
                                                
7 Block, Ned. “Inverted Earth,”, Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 4, Action Theory and 
Philosophy of Mind (1990), pp. 53-79, circa p. 60. 
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Imagine that, unbeknownst to her, my twin on twin earth was affixed at birth with 
lenses that invert the light that hits her retinas. If she were to look at earth grass red 
light would reach her retinas, and when she looks at inverted earth grass green light 
reaches her retinas.  
Here we must ask whether my twin has experiences as of redness when 
looking at inverted earth grass, or as of greenness. (Note the use of the phrase “as of 
x” rather than merely “of x”. Whereas my twin has an “experience of redness” when 
looking at red grass, because it is caused by looking at red grass, it is an open 
question what the content of the experience is, hence what the experience is “as of”.) 
If my twin has an experience as of greenness she and I have the same type of 
perceptual state. However, if she has an experience as of redness we have different 
ones despite the fact that all of our mental states, perceptual states, and other states to 
do with colour processing, are physically and phenomenologically the same. Despite 
the fact that my twin and I are not completely identical, because she alone has 
inverting lenses, this latter case motivates externalism. Most people have the intuition 
that we have mental states of the same type: she has an experience as of the greenness 
of grass, one that feels greenish and is for all purposes the same as the state that I am 
in when I look at grass. The internalist position is clearly consistent with this 
outcome. An internalist maintains that the factors that individuate the content of 
mental states are within the body or some restricted part of it. Thus, the differences in 
our respective external environments make no individuative difference to the contents 
of our mental states. Because we are the same from the retina inwards we have mental 
states with the same type of content. The intuition seems to be that in cases where the 
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way something appears is different from the way it is, the content of a state with a 
phenomenal feel ought to be aligned with how it feels. Thus we intuit that whatever 
the individuation of states with qualitative content depends on is internal to us—and 
clearly this is an internalist intuition. The external environment is causally relevant to 
what kind of states we have. However, the external environment does not seem to be 
individuatively relevant. (Causally speaking, my twin could not have an experience as 
of greenness if it were not for the red grass and inverting lenses. However, the 
experiment shows that appearance can come apart from reality in the case of 
something experienced, and that in such a case it seems prima facie that the external 
environment is not relevant to the individuation.) Whereas the water twin earth 
experiment appears to support externalism about propositional attitudes, the inverted 
earth experiment appears to support internalism about perceptual states, at least on 
first reading. Externalists do have possible responses to the intuition concerning 
narrow content in the inverted earth case, as Chapter 3 will show. Perhaps externalists 
will be able to give an adequate error theory for the intuition, but it may turn out to be 
better to satisfy rather than explain away this intuition. 
The inverted earth experiment concerns perceptual experiences and does not 
concern purely phenomenal states such as pain. It seems hard to imagine that there 
could be an equivalent thought experiment that uses purely phenomenal states. It does 
not seem possible to create the kind of divide between appearance and reality needed 
for such an experiment in the case of a state such as pain. However, one does not 
need to. Block’s thought experiment serves to show that those things in the external 
world that might be relevant to the individuation of perceptual experiences are in fact 
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not relevant. In the case of phenomenal states, at least prima facie, there do not seem 
to be any factors in the external world that might be relevant to individuation. Tickles 
do not seem to be individuated by feathers, or pains by thumb tacks. (It is possible to 
argue that they are individuated by certain states of the body, and as we have seen, on 
some definitions of internalism, this could be a threat. However, such explanations 
are intuitively implausible. If an individual sincerely claims to be suffering a pain 
despite having absolutely no bodily damage or other bodily state by which one may 
wish to individuate pain, I am still inclined to think that such an individual is in pain. 
Pains in phantom limbs may turn out to be viable real world examples of such a 
phenomenon.) One does not need an intuition pump in the form of a thought 
experiment to have an internalist intuition about these states. 
I now turn to a further motivation for internalism about perceptual experiences 
and purely phenomenal states. There has been considerable debate about whether our 
perceptual experiences and purely phenomenal states are transparent, meaning that 
we cannot introspect anything about experience but merely “see through” our 
experiences to the objects and properties of things in the world.8 When I attempt to 
introspect the experience as of a round, red tomato, I draw my attention to roundness 
and redness, but these are properties of the tomato. However, I may also be able note 
blurriness, visualness, reddishness or other property that is actually of the experience. 
If perceptual experiences are not transparent, and prove to have some introspectable 
content that does not merely present elements of the external world, then this content 
                                                
8 See for example Block, Ned.  “Mental Paint and Mental Latex,” in E. Villanueva (ed.), 
Perception, Philosophical Issues 7, Ridgeview: 1996, and Tye, Michael. “The Function of 
Consciousness”, Nous, Vol. 30,  No. 3. (1996): 287-305. 
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is a natural candidate for internalist content. Transparent mental states with content 
merely representing elements of the external world can feasibly be individuated with 
reference to what they represent. However, content that is not transparent may be 
better suited to internalist individuation. Phenomenal states, assuming that they are 
not representational, are not transparent, as the content they have is introspectable. 
However, the case of perceptual experiences requires argument.  
Rey produces a thought experiment designed to show that perceptual 
experiences are not transparent.9 Imagine a man who is colour blind but has somehow 
developed a means of identifying green objects, perhaps by tracking surface 
reflectance. (It need not be the case that greenness reduces to a certain surface 
reflectance, but for this thought experiment to work greenness must covary with a 
certain surface reflectance.) This man is then given an operation that allows him to 
perceive colours normally. Both before and after the operation he is able to attend to 
the greenness of the plants around him. He may even want to say that he cannot 
introspect his experience and that the properties he sees are properties of things in the 
world. However, he can presumably introspect a difference between his previous 
experience of the world and his current experience, after the operation. The man 
before the operation is able to perceive that things are green and even have 
experiences of green things. Then after the operation, he is able to introspect a 
“greenishness” in the experience. In this case, even if the environment of the colour 
blind person remains the same, it seems that the content of his experiences will be 
                                                
9 Rey, 1998, p. 441. 
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different from what it was before, which indicates the existence of some narrow 
content.  
There are a number of possible responses to these motivations for internalism 
about perceptual experiences and phenomenal states, which will be discussed in 
Chapter 3. Firstly, notice that the inverted earth thought experiment and the argument 
from transparency both depend on intuition. Secondly, notice also that the 
motivations given here for accepting that perceptual experience has at least some 
narrow content all concern the case of colour perception; we will examine whether 
this gives us reason to think that there is narrow content in all cases of perceptual 
experience, for example that of shapes or textures or temperatures. However, while 
there are a number of issues left to discuss, it seems that the inverted earth and 
transparency arguments reveal a strong intuition in favour of internalism. This 
demonstrates the desirability of an internalist view. However, to fully understand 
Rey’s project we must turn to the motivations for representationalism.  
1.3 Arguments for Representationalism 
The representationalist view is committed to two things: first, that our mental 
states represent something, such as a state of the world, object or property; and 
second, and more contentiously, especially in the case of perceptual experiences and 
phenomenal states, that all of the content of a mental state is representational content. 
I will look briefly at what it means for the representationalist position to be true of a 
mental state, and then at the arguments available to a representationalist about 
perceptual experiences and phenomenal states. These concern both support for the 
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claim that these have representational content at all, and that all of their content is 
representational. 
Representational content is content that is about or refers to something. A 
representation exists when there are regular correlations between some entity and 
some other entity that it stands for. The word “cat” represents cats and stands for cats 
in our language. Instead of having to find and point to cats when we need to talk 
about them we can simply use the word “cat”. Just as words have reference, i.e. what 
they pick out, mental representations have contents, which is what they pick out. Like 
the reference of the word “cat” is cat, the content of an experience as of greenness 
could arguably be greenness. Moreover, just as when we use the word “cat” wrongly 
it actually still nonetheless refers to cats (e.g. in the phrase “Harry Potter is a cat”), 
when we have non-veridical experiences they can have the same content as veridical 
ones. Consider a scenario in which I am having a veridical experience of a brown 
cup. A representationalist will say that I have an experience that represents the cup 
and the brownness, and that the represented brownness is a represented property of 
the represented cup. Moreover, the same will be said of the case of non-veridical 
representation. Imagine that I am in fact hallucinating. There is no actual cup, but the 
representation still exists and the “brownishness” of my experience is still a 
represented property of the represented cup. In this case convention dictates that we 
refer to the cup as an “intentional inexistent”: it is that thing which the experience is 
about though it does not actually exist.  
In the case of perceptual experiences, it is easy to argue for some 
representational content. These states simply seem to be about something. Holding 
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that such states are representational has a number of advantages. Perceptual 
experiences are sometimes veridical and sometimes non-veridical: that we are 
sometimes correct about what we take ourselves to be perceiving, and sometimes 
incorrect. This is easily explained in terms of these perceptual experiences sometimes 
being accurate representatations and sometimes being inaccurate ones. We also think 
that perceptual experiences serve to give us information about the external world. It 
seems that my experience as of redness, if it is a veridical one, gives information 
about elements present in my environment. This makes sense in the context of our 
mental states representing these elements. (However, as I will explain in Chapter 2, 
Rey does not take them to be representations of anything in the external environment. 
Nonetheless, abstracted from Rey’s view, this is a substantial reason to think that 
perceptual experiences are representational.) 
It is much harder to argue that phenomenal states are representational. 
Consider a claim difficult for a representationalist to make plausible: the claim that 
pain represents. Representationalists can claim that pain represents bodily damage. If 
this is the case, this representation nonetheless seems very different from the 
representation of the propositional attitude expressed as “I have bodily damage”. As 
Ned Block points out, one’s own pain is phenomenally impressive, and has a sense of 
urgency to it.10 When one is in enough pain it can be very hard to ignore, and tends to 
shape one’s immediate actions. This does not show that pain lacks any 
representational content, or even that it fails to be exhausted by its representational 
content. However, as a characterization of a pain, maintaining that it represents bodily 
                                                
10 Block, 1996, p. 31. 
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damage seems to ignore everything that matters, phenomenally speaking. This is an 
intuition-based argument against the idea that phenomenal content reduces to 
representational content. 
However, there are some reasons to think that phenomenal states are 
representational. A representationalist view provides a fairly promising way to 
explain the origins of qualitative content without admitting the existence of some kind 
of non-physical, phenomenal properties. (Non-physical phenomenal properties are 
notoriously hard to naturalise, and many philosophers are unwilling to include them 
in their ontologies, for good reason.) A natural understanding is that a state of pain is 
painful in virtue of having some property of painfulness. However, an account can be 
given that does not include a problematic property of this type. From the 
representationalist stance, phenomenal states can have the content they do because of 
what they represent, rather than because of any phenomenal properties that they 
might have. The representationalist strategy reduces qualitative content to 
representational content. Phenomenal states would simply be a different type of 
representation of real entities, be they within one’s body or mind, or in the external 
world. It may not seem plausible to reduce qualitative content to representational 
content. As mentioned above, pain does not seem to represent anything, let alone 
reduce to a mere representation. Yet this possibility might be able to answer the 
question of what qualitative content is without requiring recourse to distinct, non-
physical phenomenal properties. However, this motivation is only viable within the 
context of an acceptable theory of content: rather than having to contend with 
potentially problematic phenomenal properties, one would instead have to give an 
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explanation of how an account of phenomenal content could explain the nature of 
states such as pain. As I will show in Chapter 4, this proves to be a major obstacle for 
Rey. 
Another way to argue for representationalism about all states, including 
phenenomenal states, is to argue that to be a mental state simply is to be a 
representational state. As Brentano famously maintained, intentionality (or aboutness, 
which in essence equates to representation) is the mark of the mental.11 Viewing the 
mental as being entirely representational helps when one is attempting to give a 
unified account of the mind. Our different types of mental states interact with one 
another not just causally, but in terms of content. Beliefs and desires seem to have 
representational content, and their interactions with other states can naturally be 
understood in terms of other states also having representational content. If, for 
example, I have a phenomenal state of pain, this can lead me to have the belief that I 
have been hurt. This occurrence is most easily explained if my phenomenal state of 
pain actually represents something to do with my being hurt. While this is not a 
definitive argument for represenationalism, it is a motivating factor. 
A final motivation for representationalism arises out of the transparency issue, 
which was discussed in Section 1.2 on arguments for internalism. If it turns out that 
representational states are in fact transparent, then one is hard pressed to argue that 
they have any non-representational content. One can argue for transparency by 
appealing to introspection of mental states. As seen in the previous section, there is a 
certain plausibility to such an argument. When one is experiencing a buttercup and 
                                                
11 Rey, 1998, p. 438 or see Brentano himself: Brentano, Franz. Psychology from an Empirical 
Standpoint, transl. by A.C. Rancurello, D.B. Terrell, and L. McAlister, Routledge: 1973. 
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one attempts to introspect the experience, it seem that one is able to notice a number 
of properties about the buttercup but nothing else. Yellowness, shininess and a certain 
shape all seem to be properties of the buttercup, and it is hard to see what might in 
fact be a property of the experience. This seems to indicate that the content of the 
mental state is merely representational content, representing elements perceived. 
However, this is not an argument to which Rey can appeal. It is possible to argue 
against such a theory, and Rey chooses to do so with his thought experiment 
concerning the colour-blind patient. He would maintain that as well as the yellowness 
of the buttercup, there seems to be another property, namely the yellowishness of the 
experience. Rey uses this thought experiment to show that there is content that does 
not represent anything in the external world. As the next chapter will make clear, he 
believes that all content is representational, though states with qualitative content in 
fact represent such properties as yellowishness, though for him such properties are 
actually fictitious. 
It is worth noting at least one reason one might want to reject 
representationalism, and even want to reject the view that states with qualitative 
content represent at all. Because of the limited length of this thesis, it can only focus 
on some of the aspects of Rey’s position. Specifically, it focuses on internalism, 
rather than representationalism. However, it is by no means clear that 
representationalism about phenomenal states and perceptual experiences is correct. 
William Alston, for example, identifies several reasons why one might reject 
representationalism in the cases of phenomenal states and perceptual experiences 
(before they become concept laden; for example, the visual experience as it hit the 
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eyes rather than one’s experience as of a cat after some conceptualisation occurs).12 
Alston first challenges the idea that these have a representational function. He holds 
the plausible view that providing information to the propositional attitude system is 
one of the key functions of qualitative experience, if not the sole function. Many 
representationalists also believe this, and Alston argues that the need to accommodate 
this function is a reason that leads Dretske, Tye and Lycan to a representationalist 
position.13 However, one need not commit to representationalism to ensure this. 
Alston points out that information can be carried where there is no representation, 
such as smoke carrying the information that there is fire without actually representing 
it. He says that if mental states such as phenomenal states and perceptual experiences 
were representational, they would be like fifth wheels: propositional attitudes already 
perform that function.14 (Admittedly, on Dretske’s account, carrying information is 
the basis of representation. However, this is not a problem for Alston because Dretske 
does not think that carrying information is sufficient for representation.) 
The above considerations provide considerable but not definitive motivation 
for representationalism about perceptual experiences and phenomenal states. It is 
intuitive to think that perceptual experiences have some representational content, 
however the case of phenomenal states can be difficult to argue for and one might not 
think that the content of either of these types of states is entirely representational 
content. Yet representationalism can be used to explain the nature of qualitative 
content. There are arguments for representationalism from transparency, an argument 
                                                
12 Alston, William. “Perception and Representation”, Philosophy and  
Phenomenological Research Vol. 70, No. 2 (2005): 253-289. 
13 Ibid., p. 259. 
14 Ibid., p. 277. 
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that representation is the mark of the mental, and an apparent link between 
representation and veridicality. These provide a basis for accepting that all mental 
content is representational content, thereby accepting representationalism. The current 
project is to assess whether Rey successfully reconciles internalism with his core 
representationalist position, and hence internalism rather than representationalism 
provides the focus of this thesis. 
Conclusion 
With the advantages of internalism and representationalism explored, it 
remains to be seen how Rey is able to argue for a position combining the two views. 
Both internalism and representationalism have certain advantages, despite the fact 
that both positions can be contested. We will look further at the issues concerning 
internalism in Chapter 3, in preparation for identifying problems with Rey’s account 
and proposing an alternative in Chapter 4. Yet there is enough motivation for each of 
these views to make evident the worth of exploring Rey’s suggested combination of 
them. The following chapter will present Rey’s view in detail.  
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Chapter 2: Rey’s Position 
For Rey, both perceptual experiences and phenomenal states have narrow 
representational content. This is an unusual view that diverges greatly from the type 
of representationalism held by many externalists. The externalist representationalists 
maintain that a state is individuated with respect to elements in the external world that 
it represents. Yet Rey maintains that states with qualitative content appear to 
represent phenomenal properties, but that these properties do not in fact exist (making 
him an eliminativist representationalist). Because of this, Rey cannot hold that 
content arises out of what is individuated, as the representational externalists do. Rey, 
in fact, maintains that a state is individuated relative to its functional role. In order to 
make sense of this, I will first turn to an analogy with states involving indexicals, 
which Rey uses to show the viability of narrow representational content. Then I will 
briefly discuss the way in which externalism and representationalism fit together, 
before turning to Rey’s attempt to fit internalism to his representationalist view 
instead. I will then present Rey’s view in detail, discussing the eliminativist aspect of 
his view first and then his position generally. 
2.1 An Introductory Analogy 
One significant consideration that motivates Rey to think that narrow 
representationalism is possible involves an analogy between his narrow 
representationalism and a certain view of how we should understand mental states 
involving indexicality. For mental states with qualitative content, Rey takes both 
internalism and representationalism to be well motivated. He holds that since it is 
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desirable to hold each of these positions independently of one another, if it is possible 
and not problematic to hold both, then this will also be desirable—i.e. it is desirable 
to be a narrow content representationalist about states with qualitative content. Rey 
attempts to show that narrow representationalism is possible via an analogy with 
another case, that of certain indexical thoughts: thoughts which are expressed using 
indexicals, pointers such as “I” and “now”. 15 It seems fairly intuitive that my 
thoughts that would be expressed using the indexical “I” actually represent me, and 
that thoughts that use “now” represent the current time. As will become clear below, 
there are also a number of reasons for believing that thoughts expressed using such 
indexicals have narrow content. 
Let us look at the so-called “subjective ‘I’ thoughts” (which can also be called 
‘de se thoughts’). These are thoughts about oneself that present oneself to oneself as 
oneself. Consider the following case. If one comes in with arm loads of groceries, 
leaves the door open and forgets altogether about it, one could easily walk by later 
and think that somebody left the door open. This thought is about oneself, but it is not 
a subjective “I” thought because one does not realize that it is about oneself. Imagine 
that this person suddenly remembers having left the door open. That person can now 
think a thought such as “oh, I left the door open”. This thought has roughly the 
content “somebody left the door open, and it was me”. Thoughts with this additional 
aspect are subjective “I” thoughts. It is the “being about me” aspect of subjective “I” 
thoughts that Rey takes to be the narrow aspect of the thought. He believes it does not 
matter who has the thought, and that for any speaker capable of it in any environment 
                                                
15 Rey, 1998, p. 446. 
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this content will be the same. This view satisfies our intuition that there is a sense in 
which you and I have the same type of thought when we each think “I left the door 
open”, despite the fact our thoughts pick out different people.  
Rey attempts to provide support for the view that indexical thoughts have 
narrow content by arguing that narrow content is needed for certain psychological 
generalisations. Essentially, he argues that there is a narrow functional role for these 
states involving indexicality: these states perform a function that can be characterised 
in a narrow way. As we will explore more fully below, for Rey narrow content states 
depend for their individuation on their functional role. Explaining impulsiveness or 
selfishness requires the use of the narrow aspect of certain indexicals. If I am selfish I 
take resources for Alexandra McKubre, not because of who she is, but because she is 
me. Other people can be selfish and those people are doing the same type of thing as I 
am, even though they are taking goods for themselves, rather than for me. This 
indicates to Rey that the aspect of the indexical that matters in a generalisation such 
as “selfish people take things for themselves (ceteris paribus)” is the narrow aspect. 
The subjective “I” means something in such a generalisation regardless of who the 
“I” in question happens to be. For another example, and to see the narrow aspect of 
another type of indexical, consider the case of impulsiveness. A person acting 
impulsively is acting on the belief that might best be expressed “sooner is better than 
later”. Here the indexicals “sooner” and “later” pick out times in the future, sooner 
being closer to now and later being further from it, whenever now happens to be. The 
current time is irrelevant. To make this out we use the narrow aspect of the indexical.
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2.2 Externalist Representationalism 
Rey’s view can be seen as an attempt to escape from the apparent conflict 
between internalism and representationalism. To see why these positions seem to be 
in opposition to each other we will need to turn briefly to other, more standard 
varieties of representationalism. As a sample case we will look at Tye’s view, which 
is a type of representationalism that fits cohesively with externalism and conflicts 
with internalism. Recall that transparency can be used to argue for representation. It 
forms a part of the standard representationalist externalist picture. Tye’s view that an 
entire state is representational can be attributed to his views about transparency. 
Someone who holds this type of representationalism is predisposed to adopt an 
externalist rather than an internalist view. Externalism gives a natural explanation as 
to how representations come to represent, giving one reason to hold externalism and 
representationalism in conjunction.  
Unlike Rey, Tye believes that our experiences are transparent, allowing us to 
“look through them” to the actual elements of the world that they represent.16 Rey 
thinks that we are able to introspect our experience and apparently perceive 
additional, qualitative aspects of this experience that do not simply portray elements 
of the external world. Tye, on the other hand, believes that when we look at, say, a 
red tomato in the world and attempt to introspect this experience, everything we are 
able to note about this experience actually represents elements of the world. However, 
                                                
16 Tye, Michael. “Representationalist Theories of Consciousness,” forthcoming in The Oxford 
Handbook of Philosophy of Mind, ed. by B. McLaughlin and A. Beckermann, Oxford 
University Press. Accessed via 
<http://www.utexas.edu/cola/depts/philosophy/faculty/tye/RepresentationalistTheoriesOfCon
sciousness.pdf> See especially circa  p. 7.  
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there are certain possible counter-examples to the transparency hypothesis, including 
blurriness of visual experience, the visualness of visual experience and other such 
sense-modality properties, and the thought experiment about the colour-blind patient 
used by Rey.  
Tye’s views on transparency help to ground a simple account of 
representation and content individuation. In essence, the content of representational 
states comes from those elements in the world that are represented, as every element 
of the content of a representation actually corresponds to something in the world. This 
creates explicit ties between externalism and representationalism. An externalist 
usually holds that a mental state will come to have the content it does due to some 
kind of interaction or connection with the external world. One could hold that some 
mental state X has content φ due to interacting causally with φs in the world and that 
it also represents φs. Further, one could hold that the mental state represents φs 
precisely because it interacts causally with them. This is the basis of Dretske’s and 
Fodor’s views, among others.17 As we will see in Chapter 3, there are a variety of 
types of externalism, and some vary considerably from the one just described. 
However, they operate on the same basic principle: what mental states represent and 
the means by which they are individuated are closely related, or even identical. It is 
advantageous for Tye to be an externalist because of the explanation it gives for how 
states come to represent those things they represent. 
Where externalism provides support for and makes sense of the 
representationalist position, internalism appears to do the opposite, causing problems 
                                                
17 See e.g. Fodor, 1987 and Dretske, 1995. 
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for such a view. If the environment makes no individuative difference to my mental 
state, then this mental state does not seem to be the right type of state to have the 
power to represent the external world. However, this does not mean that narrow 
mental states cannot have any representational content. In particular it is clear that 
one could have states whose contents represented something within the mind. Yet 
most representationalists would like to be able to claim that we have mental states, 
perceptual experiences in particular, that represent elements of the external world. 
There is a difficult question concerning how mental states could come to represent 
elements in the external environment when nothing in the external environment is 
relevant to making them the types of states that they are. It appears, on first analysis, 
that externalism fits naturally with representationalism, while internalism does not. 
Thus Rey seems to face a difficult task to make his narrow representationalism 
plausible. As we will see below, Rey takes perceptual experiences to represent 
phenomenal properties (which he does not take to be properties of the external world, 
or even to exist at all). Thus for Rey, over against Tye, perceptual experiences are 
representational, yet represent nothing real in the external world. 
2.3 Eliminativism 
Rey’s account is unlike that of the representationalist externalists. He is 
committed to representationalism, for reasons such as those given in Section 1.3. 
However, the view becomes less natural and much less conventional when combined 
with internalism. Adopting internalism leads Rey to hold the position that states with 
qualitative content do not represent anything in the external world. In fact, Rey adopts 
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an even stronger position. Specifically, he holds that the content of states with 
qualitative content actually does not represent anything real at all. Given this, Rey has 
to provide an explanation for how that content comes to be the content it is without 
involving anything being represented.  
One possible option for an internalist representationalist is to maintain that 
states with qualitative content are individuated by what they represent—not elements 
of the external world, but elements of the body or the mind. This is not the option that 
Rey chooses. On such an account states with qualitative content could represent 
phenomenal properties, where these properties are properties of brain or mental 
states. Instead of claiming that the experience as of redness represents redness, one 
could instead claim that this experience represents reddishness. In fact, adopting such 
an approach coheres well with the inverted earth thought experiment and other 
motivations for internalism. It is helpful to maintain that the representational content 
of the experience as of redness is not actually redness. After all, according to an 
internalist, the content of the experience and the actual redness in the world can 
become disjoint from one another, not merely in one-off cases of misperception, but 
systematically so. This can be taken to demonstrate that experiences are concerned 
with certain phenomenal feelings, rather than with properties in the external world.  
Rey argues that states with qualitative content do represent phenomenal 
properties. However, he also argues that these properties do not exist, and thus that 
states with qualitative content do not represent anything real. In Rey’s words, “while 
experience seems and maybe even purports to refer to certain phenomenal objects and 
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properties, it doesn’t actually succeed in doing so.”18  For Rey, there are no 
phenomenal properties such as reddishness or painfulness. While states with 
qualitative content are representational, the represented elements are merely 
intentional properties. To quote Rey again, “[i]nstead of being special properties of 
the representation, they are simply properties of what the representation purports to 
represent.”19 As such, on Rey’s account, narrow content is representational, but does 
not represent anything real, even internal to the body.  
Prima facie, this eliminativism is counter-intuitive. It seems outrageous to 
suggest to someone in pain that his or her pain does not have some property of 
painfulness, or that there is no reddish property to an experience as of redness. It 
seems obvious that pains are painful, but it is difficult to see how this sentence could 
be true if there is no such property as painfulness. However, Rey is able to employ an 
analogy to render this more plausible, specifically one concerned with viewing a 
Mickey Mouse movie.  
Rey holds that our states can have just as much significance for us irrespective 
of whether they actually represent anything real or not. Imagine an individual who 
has never before seen a movie (or even heard of one), who is faced with a Mickey 
Mouse film.20 Rey holds that regardless of whether the images of Mickey Mouse 
actually represent anything, the action on the screen and the emotions of the 
characters have significance for the viewer. He speaks of how the viewer will think 
that Mickey is real, and may attempt to follow him as he moves off screen and so 
                                                
18 Rey, Georges. Contemporary Philosophy of Mind: A Contentiously Classical Approach, 
Blackwell: 1997, p. 288. 
19 Ibid., p. 301. 
20 Ibid., p. 306.  
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forth.21 Within the context of the movie these things make sense, even though Mickey 
Mouse does not exist. Likewise, within the context of our mental states, a state with 
narrow qualitative content has significance. These states are representational, but do 
not represent anything real: phenomenal properties are merely represented properties. 
Moreover, Rey’s eliminativism has another advantage. Being an eliminativist saves 
Rey from the difficult problem of naturalizing phenomenal properties. As Rey 
comments, eliminativism prevents “treating phenomenal properties as some sort of 
real properties possessed by either queer things in some dualistic world or by physical 
things in some queer way”.22 
Despite the unusual nature of a representationalist position where nothing real 
is represented, even on such a view there are significant motivations to be a 
representationalist. As alluded to in Section 1.3, Brentano’s thesis offers one 
motivation for thinking that these narrow mental states do have representational 
content. This thesis, to which Rey is committed, asserts that that the mind is an 
intentional organ: mental states are states that are representational. All of our mental 
states are one and the same sort of thing, namely representations. Mental states, 
whether or not there is anything that they represent, are the type of things that have 
representational content.23 However, Rey cannot simply point out that mental states 
are all representations. This is insufficient to show that what he calls narrow 
representational states truly have what is required to be representations: he must show 
                                                
21 Ibid., p. 306. 
22 Ibid., p. 301. 
23 Ibid., p. 301.  
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how they come to have content. Section 2.4 presents Rey’s position about the 
individuation of these states with qualitative content. 
2.4 Rey’s Account 
In externalist representationalist cases, the content individuation of states with 
qualitative content can be in terms of the represented entity. The same can be true in 
an internalist representationalist case where states with qualitative content represent 
phenomenal properties instantiated in the mind or brain. However, Rey must give a 
different account due to his eliminativist position. He opts for an account based on the 
narrow functional role of a state: what it is this state’s job to do within out mental 
processes. This functional role is comprised of two aspects, syntax (the structural 
aspect) and semantics (the meaning aspect). For Rey, the syntax of a mental state is 
composed of the relations between this state and others, i.e. the states that are apt to 
cause this state and the states it is apt to cause. On the other hand, the semantics of a 
mental state involves what the state represents. The semantics of a mental state, like 
the syntax, depends on the states that are apt to hold causal relations to it, specifically 
on the contents of these states. This will be explained below. 
Rey subscribes to the language-of-thought (LOT) hypothesis, within the 
context of which his view can be explained more fully.24 The LOT hypothesis asserts 
that our thoughts (and other states with representational content, thus for Rey, all 
mental states) take place in a mental language or “language of thought”. The syntax 
of this language is realised in the physical structure of our brains. Essentially, the 
                                                
24 Ibid., circa  p. 208. 
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theory explains how meaningful, representational mental states can take part in 
physical causal processes. Like predicates in natural language, predicates in the LOT 
have both structure and meaning: syntax and semantics. The syntactic units of the 
LOT are actually physical elements of the brain organised in accordance with certain 
syntactic rules. The example of computer programming shows how complex 
processing can occur based on the manipulation of syntactical elements. Running 
programs to do the myriad of tasks computers can perform merely amounts to 
manipulating long strings of ones and zeros: manipulating symbols. Yet mental states 
are more than mere symbol manipulation. They also have a meaning, namely their 
content: thus they have a semantics. On a representationalist account, this semantics 
is the representational content of these states, such as the representational content 
reddishness in the case of an experience as of redness. 
Rey’s view can be called a “functional role” or “functionalist” account of 
individuation because he individuates mental states based on the functional role that 
they perform, or what it is their job to do in the language of thought. This must be 
explored first on a syntactic level, and then on a semantic one. When explaining this, 
Rey speaks of sentences, predicates and predication in the LOT, rather than mental 
states. This terminology abstracts away from mental states as implemented in the 
human brain, and instead captures the “language” that allows them to be realized.25 
(The account emphasises the importance of structure and meaning over specific 
instantiations, such as in the brain.) Distinct predications in the LOT have different 
characteristic processing, which give them their syntactic functional role. Rey takes 
                                                
25 Ibid., p 210. 
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sensory predications, such as the one corresponding to the experience as of redness, 
to be a type of objectless predication, restricted in certain ways. He gives them the 
structure “It(R)s”, comparing them to objectless predications in natural language, 
such as “It rains”. 26 They are not, after all, predications about any specific object, but 
mere experiences, such as the experience as of redness. They will have certain 
proximal stimulus conditions, and will consequently lead to certain other 
characteristic processing. We will come to have a specific syntactic state given 
certain situations in our sensory processing systems: Rey notes that “visual 
predications are apparently marked for hue, lightness, saturation. . .”, and pains for 
intensity and location in the body.27 When in this state we will make other sensory 
predications, for example of warm-colouredness, and we will even suffer aversion in 
the case of pain. These processes are essential to a state having the content it has. 
They help to make a state an experience as of redness or otherwise, and are thus 
factors that cause it to be individuated the way that it is. 
However, syntax alone is insufficient for a representation. As is clear in the 
case of natural language, unless words and combinations of them actually mean 
something, syntactically well-formed combinations of them are merely strings of 
symbols representing nothing. As such, semantics must be accounted for. Whereas 
externalists will say that these syntactic elements are able to be meaningful and 
contentful due to certain relations to the external world, Rey has to give a different 
account. He notes that “[his account] does raise what can seem like a surprising issue 
about the semantics of experience—if experience involves referential devices, what 
                                                
26 Ibid., p. 296. 
27 Ibid., p. 296.  
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do they refer to?”28 Yet Rey’s specific, fictionalist breed of eliminativism may be able 
to provide an answer to this question. He claims that in addition to the syntax of state 
with qualitative content, there is a meaning relation, hence there is semantic content. 
Yet these states do not succeed in representing real properties. They purport to 
represent real properties, but in fact only represent fictional ones. However, the states 
to which states with qualitative content are apt to bear causal relations fix the 
representation content of these states. 
Thus, he says, “a sensory experience of type F consists of the processing 
peculiar to an S-restricted predicate, φ, that means [F]”29. This claim needs some 
elucidation. In saying that the predicate in the LOT must be S-restricted, Rey merely 
means that this predicate has certain proximal stimulus conditions, certain 
characteristic processing and so forth, essentially a certain syntactic-functional role, 
as discussed above. The key question with regard to understanding the nature of 
representational content is how it is able to have meaning, to “mean [F]”. 
It is possible for a specific state with qualitative content to have the type of 
content it does because of the relations it is apt to hold with other states: the states 
that in general cause this state and are caused by it. As was stated previously, on the 
syntactic level, the function of a state with qualitative content is given by the relations 
it holds to these states. On the semantic level, the functional role of a state is 
representing whatever it represents. The semantics of a state with qualitative content 
is possible because of the content of the states to which it is apt to bear these causal 
relations. Rey claims that “a red sensory experience would involve comp-avowing a 
                                                
28 Ibid., p. 288.  
29 Ibid., p. 296.  
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restricted predication “It(R)s,” as a result of the stimulation of predominantly “red” 
(or, more exactly, L-wave) sensitive cones, a comp-avowal that. . . could normally 
occur only in this way. It is the latter that makes it. . . a red experience”.30 “Comp-
avowing” a predication refers to having the computational (syntactic-functional) 
structure to avow to this predication; meaning, in the case of “It(R)s”, that there is a 
level on which one could sincerely assert that “It(R)s”.31 Essentially, Rey is claiming 
that one has a red sensory experience if one is willing to say something along the 
lines of “it reds” or (in more understandable English, but less accurately) “something 
in the world seems red to me”, and that one is willing to say this because of 
stimulation of “red” sensitive cones. The word “say” should not be taken too literally; 
infants, non-verbal adults and so forth can comp-avow to predicates. Rey here is 
claiming that the experience as of redness has the content it does because of relations 
it bears to other mental states and the contents they have. Specifically, this experience 
is the one it is because it is normally caused by states involved with perceiving 
redness, states of the retina. 
To summarise, Rey maintains that states with qualitative content are 
individuated by their functional role. Functional role is comprised of two aspects, a 
syntactic and a semantic aspect. Syntactically speaking, the functional role of a state 
with qualitative content is given by the causal relations it holds with the states that are 
apt to cause it and the states that it is apt to cause. The semantic functional role of the 
state in question, and hence the representational content of that state, is given by 
                                                
30 Ibid., p. 296. 
31 Ibid., p. 290 for information on the prefix “comp”, and p. 294 for information on 
“avowing”. 
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relations to these same other states and the contents that they have. Thus states have 
their content in virtue of relations they hold to other states. These other states may or 
may not themselves need to be individuated widely. However, it seems that the 
relations held between states can be characterised narrowly. In this, Rey has found a 
narrow way to individuate states with qualitative content while nonetheless 
maintaining that they do have representational content. 
Returning to a contrast with a typical externalist representationalist account, 
such as Tye's, may help in the understanding of Rey's position. Rey’s account 
acknowledges that there seem to be phenomenal properties, but shows why it is that 
these properties do not actually need to exist. Tye on the other hand thinks that 
represented properties are all actual properties of the external environment. Instead of 
holding that there are distinct phenomenal properties, someone like Tye will hold that 
states with qualitative content simply represent properties such as redness, and when 
we attempt to introspect these mental states, it is these properties of which we are 
actually aware. While both accounts do not posit phenomenal properties as properties 
of mental states, they accomplish this in different ways. Rey’s does so in the context 
of a narrow account on which the semantics of a state with qualitative content is due 
to other states to which it is apt to hold causal relations. He argues that our states can 
still be significant to us even though phenomenal properties do not actually exist, 
because we can account for states with qualitative content without them. Tye and 
other externalist representationalists who accept transparency believe that there are no 
separate phenomenal properties simply because they think that our representations 
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represent elements of the world, and no distinct phenomenal properties are needed on 
such an account. 
Conclusion 
 Rey’s is an unusual position that, if it is successful, manages to 
reconcile the seemingly opposing positions of representationalism and internalism. In 
the next chapter I consider internalism in further depth and present a variety of 
relevant alternative views. This provides the necessary background for analysing 
Rey’s view in Chapter 4. There it will be addressed whether internalism proves after 
all to be a desirable or even tenable option for a representationalist of Rey’s variety. 
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Chapter 3: Issues in Assessing an Internalist Account 
To assess Rey’s account several issues need to be considered. Chapter 1 
motivated internalism largely through the use of thought experiments concerning 
colour perception, specifically concerning inverted earth and the transparency of 
mental states. Here I show that these arguments can be extended, and that there is 
reason to accept internalism about other types of states as well. I consider the 
objection to internalism that it is motivated by mere intuition, and I reject it. I also 
explore some other possible views, showing how Rey’s fits within the range of 
alternatives. I begin with the internalist view of Terrence Horgan, John Tienson and 
George Graham, which serves both to help motivate internalism and to provide an 
internalist alternative to Rey’s view. The latter point is important because the 
objections I make to Rey’s view in the next chapter do not apply to internalist views 
in general, as I shall make clear by reference to the view of Horgan et al. I then turn 
to externalist possibilities. I briefly illustrate how a variety of different externalist 
views are able to respond to the thought experiments that motivate internalism. 
Finally, I turn to weak externalism, a view that proves to be very important to my 
proposed alternative to Rey’s view. Weak externalism holds that there can be 
narrowly individuated mental states, but there can only be such states given that there 
are other widely individuated ones. As the following chapter shows, Rey’s view has 
difficulty accounting for the substantiality and determinacy of qualitative content, but 
a weak externalist compromise seems to be able to salvage a modified version of his 
view. 
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3.1 Beyond Colour Perception: Extending the Arguments 
The motivations for the narrow content view that we have considered so far 
depend heavily on the case of colour perception. The inverted earth experiment and 
the transparency issue both, at least primarily, concern colour perception. One can ask 
whether arguments concerning colour experience apply to other perceptual 
experiences. We perceive innumerably many other elements of the external world 
besides colour, including shape, size, texture and, if they are in fact located in the 
external world, a myriad of tastes and smells. Moreover, we can perceive some of 
these, such as shape and size, through more than one sense. In the inverted earth case, 
we see that the way experience presents the world to us phenomenologically can fail 
to correspond to the way the world is. The internalist intuition in this case is that 
experiences are individuated by, or at least in conjunction with, their phenomenology. 
However, we might not think the same about other types of perceptions, and in 
particular those that can be checked against perceptions of the same element of the 
world through a different means. Imagine someone who is looking at something 
square, but to whom it seems round. It seems one might not have an internalist 
intuition in this case: one might think such a perceiver is having a visual experience 
as of squareness, especially given the fact that the individual can reach out and touch 
the object to have a haptic experience as of squareness. 
I think that this objection to the motivations for internalism points to a lack of 
breadth of examples used rather than anything fundamentally wrong with the 
internalist position. I will look quickly at the case of shape perception to see how an 
inverted-earth type thought experiment might be mounted there. I hope to 
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demonstrate that a treatment similar to that given in the visual experience case can be 
given in a case involving a different sense. This will show that internalist intuitions 
and motivations are not peculiar to the case of vision.  
In Mental Content, Colin McGinn gives an example of a perceiver, whom he 
calls Percy, who, due to some atmospheric condition, perceives round objects as 
square.32 (Note that McGinn is a weak externalist. His position is explored in Section 
3.5.) Imagine a world filled with people who are physically identical to us, and 
phenomenologically identical to us in all respects except that round things seem to 
them the same way that square things seem to us on earth. When an individual on this 
twin earth, Percy, sees a coin, in as far as the visual appearance of the object is 
concerned the coin seems square. For now, let us say that Percy never has the 
opportunity to touch, or sense in any way other than visually, the coin or any other 
round objects. We must now ask what type of experience Percy has when looking at 
the coin. There seems to be a meaningful sense in which he is having an experience 
as of squareness, rather than as of roundness. This would be a direct parallel with 
what the inverted earth experiment attempts to demonstrate about colour experience. 
One might think that there is a problematic complication if we introduce 
another mode of sensory experience, say, by allowing Percy to touch the coin. Here 
while it seems visually to Percy as if he is experiencing squareness, haptically it 
seems as if he is experiencing roundness. There seems to be problem for Rey and 
other internalists: that in this case Percy is having one experience, but we are pulled 
in two different directions as to how it is individuated. Yet Rey could merely claim 
                                                
32 McGinn, Colin. Mental Content, Blackwell: 1989, p. 60. 
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that Percy has two separate experiences, a visual experience as of squareness and a 
haptic experience as of roundness. Giving this response creates an interesting 
situation for Rey, but not necessarily a problematic one. If Percy has two separate 
experiences, one as of squareness and one as of roundness, at most one of these 
experiences can be veridical. The natural conclusion from this is that the experience 
as of roundness is veridical and that the other experience is not. An externalist might 
suggest that there is a problem with the internalist view because of this non-
veridicality. However, the Percy thought experiment attempts to show the existence 
of narrow content by presenting a case in which the phenomenology of experience 
does not correspond to the way the world actually is. In any such case, if an 
individual is able to experience the same phenomenon through multiple senses, the 
narrow content that had been argued for will turn out to be non-veridical. It may seem 
prima facie to be problematic that all instances of narrow content that we can find are 
non-veridical. However, the reason for this non-veridicality is the kind of thought 
experiment being used here: the cases in question are those where the world and 
perceptions of it do not correspond. It is perfectly reasonable to claim that Percy has a 
non-veridical experience as of squareness, but that it is nonetheless an experience as 
of squareness. (Though admittedly this may not eliminate the externalist possibility. 
McGinn uses the argument in the context of an argument for weak externalism, as we 
will see below.)  
While Rey does not make it explicit how his arguments apply to cases other 
than that of colour, it seems that his picture can work for at least the perception of 
shapes, and is likely to apply more broadly as could be shown with different thought 
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experiments. The case of colour does seem to give us information about other cases 
and a motivation for internalism in them, as well as in this particular case.   
3.2 How Well Motivated is Narrow Content?  
One can argue that the motivations for narrow content given in Chapter 1 may 
not provide the support for the narrow content view that internalists hope. The 
reasons for accepting internalism mentioned above rely on intuition; they might seem 
in need of further justification. While intuitions provide a good foundation for theory, 
intuition can be false, and might be in the cases motivating internalism. In the case of 
the inverted earth argument we must intuit that my twin on inverted earth has an 
experience as of greenness when she is looking at red grass through inverting lenses. 
In the case of the transparency argument we must intuit, at least when given examples 
like that of the colour-blind patient, that experience has a phenomenology which is 
introspectable. It is possible for these intuitions to be incorrect, or for people to have 
different intuitions (as Tye in fact would claim he does in the case of transparency). 
One (at least partial) response to this charge is to give an argument that does 
not rely on intuition. One way to do this is to turn to empirical evidence, for example 
evidence concerning the laws of perception. Rey does just this—he claims that if an 
inverted earthling on inverted earth has an experience as of redness when looking at 
red grass, the laws of perception tell us that this experience still feels coolish, in the 
way that greenish and blueish experiences normally do.33 This would indicate the 
existence of some narrow content, if just the feeling of coolishness. However, such an 
                                                
33Rey, 1998, pp. 444-445.  
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argument also seems to fail to give the solid philosophical foundation that internalism 
needs. If the laws of perception do turn out to work this way it will be empirical 
evidence for internalism. Yet a philosophical thesis should not depend on empirical 
evidence: the position should withstand different empirically falsifiable theories about 
how perception works. As such we need philosophical motivations for internalism 
that will still hold if certain views about the laws of perception turn out to be 
incorrect.  
Internalists must find another response to the charge that motivations for 
internalism are based on intuition. While our intuitions do seem to be internalist for 
some cases—those of purely phenomenal states and perceptual experiences—there 
are some reasons we may want to doubt intuition. In the internalism/externalism 
debate there are in fact some conflicts of intuition, which means that some intuitions 
will have to be sacrificed. The water twin-earth case we considered in Chapter 1, 
which motivates externalism about at least some types of propositional attitudes, is an 
appeal to intuition. The experiment brings out the intuition that the external 
environment of an individual matters for the individuation of her thoughts. At first 
this might not seem to be in conflict with our internalist intuitions about other types 
of mental states. However, once philosophers begin to build these intuitions into 
theories, the conflict becomes apparent. Externalists, for example, maintain that we 
are essentially beings within worlds, and that the contents of individuals’ mental 
states depend upon the world outside the bodies, brains or minds of those individuals. 
Internalists, by virtue of being internalists, cannot accept this. Another conflict is 
apparent in the case of perceptual experiences. Motivations like Block’s inverted 
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earth thought experiment bring to light the intuitive appeal of internalism for these 
states. However, despite Rey’s claims it seems reasonable to believe that the 
perceptual experiences represent elements of the external environment. Given such a 
view, these experiences would naturally be thought to depend for their individuation 
upon elements of the world external to an individual. These cases are evidence that at 
least some of our intuitions must be sacrificed. In light of this, it is necessary to 
further explore the alternative possibilities before we can go on to analyse Rey’s 
view. 
3.3 An Internalism Unlike Rey’s 
Let us turn to an internalist alternative to Rey’s position. This alternative 
shows how internalism can make systematic sense of mental content. This helps to 
make internalism more plausible, but also provides a point of contrast to show that 
the fate of internalism does not rest with Rey’s view alone. Horgan et al. argue that 
the individuation of mental states needs to be grounded in something internal to us, 
not in something in the world beyond the body, brain or mind.34  
Horgan et al.’s position can best be explained in terms of the brain-in-the-vat 
thought experiment. Imagine a brain in a vat of nutrients, which by various ingenious 
manipulations is kept physically type-identical to one’s own brain. Many people intuit 
                                                
34 Horgan, Terrence and John Tienson. “The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the 
Phenomenology of Intentionality”, in D. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and 
Contemporary Readings. Oxford: 2002, accessed via  http://consc.net/neh/papers/horgan.htm, 
and Horgan, Terrence, John  Tienson and George Graham, “Phenomenal Intentionality and 




that, given that this brain is kept physically type-identical to one’s own brain, its 
phenomenology is likewise type-identical to one’s own: that what it is like to be this 
brain does not differ in any way from one’s own conscious experience. To belay 
worries about mental processes being inside the wider body, this thought experiment 
may also use entire bodies in vats, which are kept physically type-identical with 
bodies of people out in the world. The vat-type thought experiment is rendered more 
plausible by a connected consideration: it seems to be epistemically possible that I in 
fact am a brain in a vat (though as we will see externalists can argue that their view 
shows that this is not possible, and moreover that their view allows us to come to 
know this). Given this, it seems that a brain in a vat and I can have mental states that, 
at least so far as phenomenology is concerned, are of the same type. Given the brain-
in-the-vat possibility, Horgan et al. take phenomenology to be more essential to the 
types of mental states we can have than anything in the external world can be. 
Horgan et al. make a case for the narrow content view by claiming that 
individuation must be in terms of phenomenology, which they take to be narrow, and 
then arguing that all mental states, including propositional attitudes, have some 
phenomenal aspect. They argue that phenomenology and intentionality (or 
representation) are not separate, as many philosophers believe, but in fact 
phenomenology is essential to what mental states represent. On this view 
phenomenology is narrow, as the brain-in-the-vat thought experiment suggests, and 
because of this mental states are narrow (except for a select few, as we will see 
below). For Horgan et al. even propositional content has phenomenal feel. There is a 
certain appeal to asserting that the content of a propositional attitude is partly 
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phenomenal as well as representing elements in the world. It seems intuitively 
plausible that it actually feels different to have the thought that rabbits have tails than 
it does to have the thought that “collections of undetached rabbit parts have tail-
subsets”.35 Even though the thoughts have the same extension, it seems there is no 
way we could mistake these thoughts for each other. Horgan and Tienson are willing 
to assert that “[i]f you pay attention to your own experience, we think you will come 
to appreciate [the] truth [concerning the phenomenology of mental states]”.36 It 
should be noted, however, that externalists can claim that Horgan et al. are conflating 
believing, hoping and so forth with experiencing.  
Even though Horgan et al. give an internalist account, they do admit that there 
are cases of wide content, including the use of some indexicals. Consider the belief 
“that painting is hanging crookedly”. There does seem to be some narrow content: in 
a way it seems that the same type of thought could be had by a brain in a vat or my 
twin on twin earth who is looking at a numerically distinct painting that is physically 
identical to the one I can see. However, there is also a sense in which they are 
different thoughts, as they are about different paintings, or in the brain in a vat case, 
no painting at all. Propositional attitudes in many cases also pick out entities in the 
world, and beliefs are made true or false because of them, so it is also intuitive to 
claim that their contents are individuated by some elements of the external world. 
Yet Horgan et al. maintain that narrow individuation of mental content is 
more fundamental than wide individuation. They do hold that some states must in part 
be individuated widely, but claim that this could not be so unless they also depend for 
                                                
35  Horgan and Tienson, 2002, Section 2. 
36 Ibid., Introduction. 
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their individuation on other, narrowly individuated states. The content must depend 
for its individuation on other mental states that in turn are individuated only by our 
phenomenology and so are narrowly rather than widely individuated. (This is in fact 
the converse of the weak externalist view, which will be considered in Section 3.5.) 
The authors mention the example of the (unconscious) mental states that are required 
for making judgements about the external world.37 They ask us to consider the 
scenario of going on a hike. Where we judge that we might best put our feet is based 
upon there appearing to be ground, and upon similar past appearances, the 
judgements we made at those earlier junctures, and the apparent results of those 
judgements. The brain in a vat who has the same phenomenology as me depends on 
the same things to make her judgements. (Note that an externalist will claim that a 
brain in a vat is not able to make apparent judgements, let alone real ones, as these 
would require elements in the external world to individuate them. A great deal rests 
on the assumption that brains in vats can have contentful mental states at all.) Yet if 
the argument does work, this is a way to expound on the idea that a brain in a vat 
identical to my brain will have the same mental states as me. Horgan et al. can 
maintain that what really matters for the individuation of the most fundamental part 
of mental states is phenomenal appearance. They hope to show that phenomenal 
appearance permeates our mental content far beyond the perceptual experiences and 
purely phenomenal states. In their work Horgan et al. find that wide content only 
makes sense in the context of narrow content. 
                                                
37 Horgan, Tienson and Graham, 2004, Section 3.6.  
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The view Horgan et al. present is a way of explaining the individuation of 
mental content in a way such that phenomenal feel is most essential to individuation. 
As we have seen, this results in an internalist view. For them, phenomenology is of 
foremost importance, and our propositional attitudes could not be the ones they are 
without phenomenology. The fact that we are creatures embodied within 
environments is of far less importance. Externalists, on the other hand, think that 
embodiment within an environment is of utmost importance. As such, both of these 
camps identify an element of the sentient creature’s situation that is what they hold to 
be essential to making mental states the states they are, be it the environment or 
phenomenology. Horgan et al. do help Rey’s case to a degree. They show that 
focusing on phenomenology can provide an at least somewhat plausible scaffolding 
for a comprehensive theory of content. In doing this they show that it can make sense 
for content to be individuatively independent of the environment in which an 
individual is embodied.  
3.4 Varieties of Externalism and Inverted Earth  
While the inverted earth case seems to motivate internalism, externalist 
possibilities are also able to account for this case. The scope of positions available to 
an externalist warrants mention, and I explore it with reference to internalist 
intuitions. This section will look at possible responses to the inverted earth case from 
various externalist views. First it considers simple causal views, then the possibility 
of teleological externalism, which maintains that the content of states is individuated 
by the evolutionary role of these states. 
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Recall that in the inverted earth case the issue at stake is the content of 
experiences had by a person who is phenomenologically identical to me and 
physically identical to me from the retinas inward, but who has had inverting lenses 
on her eyes since birth. Specifically, the question is whether she has an experience as 
of redness or as of greenness when she looks at red grass. Internalists maintain that 
she has an experience as of greenness. For them what matters for individuation is 
inside an individual, and my twin is physically identical to me from the retinas 
inward. They hold that the differences in the external environment do not matter. 
However, a simple causal externalist will hold the opposite: that my twin has an 
experience as of redness. On a simple causal view, features of the external world that 
are relevant to individuation are different in my twin’s case and mine: what she 
reliably or most commonly picks out when having certain mental states, and any 
adapted use of these mental states within a lifetime. Views such as Fodor’s (now 
rejected) ideal co-variation theory, which holds that states get their content from what 
they enable us to discriminate in ideal conditions, arise out of such simple positions.38 
Because my twin has had lenses in her eyes since birth, the experience in question 
reliably enables her to pick out redness, and it has done so throughout her life. If it 
has adapted during her lifetime to pick out something, then it has adapted to pick out 
redness. While this does not coincide with the standard intuitions, it seems to be at 
least possible that externalists of this type are able to provide a consistent externalist 
account of the inverted earth case.  
                                                
38 See e.g  Fodor, Jerry, “Psychosemantics or Where Do Truth Conditions Come From”, Mind 
and Cognition, ed. W. Lycan, Blackwell: 1990. 
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However, another version of the inverted earth case demonstrates a potential 
problem for the type of externalist mentioned above. Imagine that I immigrate to 
inverted earth, and replace my twin there, having had inverting lenses affixed in my 
eyes on the journey. The different types of externalists we have been discussing say 
different things about the content of experiences I have when looking at the red grass 
on inverted earth. For an externalist who maintains that experiences are individuated 
by what they reliably pick out, it may seem that when I first arrive on inverted earth 
they reliably pick out red things, so I have an experience as of redness. However, for 
externalists who hold that mental states are individuated by what they have most 
commonly picked out or what they have adapted over the course of a lifetime to pick 
out, I have an experience as of greenness when I come to inverted earth. What my 
experience has picked out in the past or what it has adapted to pick out does not 
change upon my arrival to inverted earth. For these externalists, a problem arises 
when after an immigrant has been on inverted earth for an extended length of time. 
The worry occurs in the case of externalists who think I am having an experience as 
of greenness, because, as I spend more time on inverted earth, the state may have to 
be individuated differently. As Block points out in his original Inverted Earth paper, 
what the state has most commonly picked out will change, and possibly what the state 
has adapted in my lifetime to pick out may change as well.39 What begins as an 
experience as of greenness may become an experience as of redness, both for those 
who think the change will be instantaneous and for those who think it will be gradual. 
                                                
39 Block, 1990, p. 61. 
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This seems troubling, especially if it is expected to happen without my 
noticing (as would be expected to happen in the parallel water case where I gradually 
come to have twater-content rather than water-content thoughts). In keeping with our 
intuition about the phenomenal feeling of perceptual experiences, it seems that 
experiences as of redness feel different from experiences as of greenness, and that 
based on that feeling we can tell them apart and know which we have. However, this 
point may not be as powerful as it at first seems, and empirical evidence may not 
support it. For example, we experience colours gradually changing with the sunset 
everyday, and it can be remarkably hard to draw one’s attention to this change.40  
However, there are other externalist possibilities that cohere better with the 
inverted earth thought experiment. Teleological externalists such as David Papineau 
and Ruth Millikan provide good examples.41 Teleological externalists believe that 
over the course of evolution certain states come to refer to certain aspects of the 
world, and that these states are individuated by whatever they have evolved to refer 
to. Even when we have non-veridical states, our states are the ones they are because 
of their evolutionary roles. It seems that teleological externalists might be able to 
comply with the internalist intuition about the standard inverted earth case and hold 
that the twin on inverted earth has states with the same content as my states. When I 
look at grass, the evolutionary role of the state with which I normally pick out 
                                                
40 Regardless of the empirical evidence, the problem might not be insurmountable. Bill Lycan 
attempts to fix the problem by separating the representational content of an experience from 
the way it feels, which he considers to be a higher order property of the state. See e.g. Lycan, 
William, "Representational Theories of Consciousness", The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Spring 2005 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.),  URL =  
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2005/entries/consciousness-representational/>.  
41 See e.g. Papineau, David Philosophical Naturalism, Basil Blackwell: 1993, and Millikan, 
Ruth, Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories, MIT Press: 1984. 
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greenness has the evolutionary function of referring to greenness. Thus it is an 
experience as of greenness according to teleological externalists. If my twin did not 
have inverting lenses, when she looked at red grass she would presumably be in 
different physical and psychological states (triggered by the different light that 
reaches her retinas), which had evolved to refer to redness, and would be an 
experience as of redness. Yet in the experiment, my twin does have inverting lenses. 
Let us assume that it is not normal for members of her species to have inverting 
lenses, and has not been normal over an evolutionary timescale. It seems that when 
my twin is looking at red grass, she will have the mental state I have when looking at 
green grass, and this will be an experience as of greenness. This appears consistent 
with the intuitions that might otherwise lead us to internalism. In this particular case, 
at least, when my twin is internally identical to me, she has an experience with the 
same type of content as the one I have.  
However, teleological externalism is not able to coincide with our intuitions in 
other cases. We can imagine entire inverted species whose members are physically 
and phenomenologically identical to us except that they have inverting lenses, and 
have had them throughout the evolutionary history of the species. In this population, 
that state that in us typically refers to green things would seemingly have evolved to 
refer to red things. According to a teleological externalist, these inverted earthlings 
have experiences as of redness when looking at red grass through inverting lenses. 
These individuals are physically identical to us, but nonetheless, at a given instant 
they may have mental states with different contents than ours, such as having an 
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experience as of redness rather than an experience as of greenness. Teleological 
externalism does not seem to satisfy the internalist intuition after all.  
Externalists do not have to capitulate because of the inverted earth thought 
experiment. However, the various externalist possibilities open are to some extent 
counter-intuitive, especially when considering modified versions of the inverted earth 
thought experiment. These externalist possibilities show that one does not have to be 
an internalist, yet in themselves they do nothing to show that internalism is not a 
viable path to pursue. However, as the next chapter will reveal, there are reasons why 
internalism, at least of Rey’s variety, may have trouble explaining certain things 
about the nature of qualitative content. The following section introduces a potentially 
more appealing version of externalism, the weak externalist view. Understanding this 
possibility will be necessary to understanding my critique of Rey’s view and 
proposed alternative to it. 
3.5 Weak Externalism 
Weak externalism provides an important alternative if internalism turns out to 
be a flawed position, as it satisfies some of the intuitions that motivate internalism. 
Externalism in fact comes in a variety of types, and some versions make compromises 
that might satisfy those who are tempted by the narrow content view. The simplest 
type of externalism is “strong externalism”, which maintains that mental states are 
individuated directly with regard to elements in an individual’s actual environment, 
i.e. that they are individuated by these elements themselves, rather than by other 
mental states which are individuated by them. However, the majority of externalists 
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in fact hold some type of weak externalism, maintaining that some of our mental 
states are not individuated directly by anything in the external world, only indirectly. 
Here we look at the versions of weak externalism held by Cynthia Macdonald and 
Colin McGinn. The two give similar but distinct accounts.  
Weak externalism claims that the content of all mental states ultimately 
depends on the content of states that are individuation-dependent on factors in the 
external world. While the content of some mental states will be individuated directly 
with regard to elements in the external world, the content of others will instead be 
individuated with regard to the content of other mental states, which will in turn 
either be individuated with regard to elements in the external world or with regard to 
the content of other mental states, and so forth, eventually connecting with some state 
whose content is directly individuated externalistically. In one sense, weak 
externalism can be seen as a response to the case of certain mental states, such as a 
thought with the content round square or the desire to see a unicorn. It seems that no 
elements in my environment are able to directly individuate thoughts with the content 
round square, because there are no round squares in my environment, never have 
been, and never could be. The standard weak externalist can claim that my thought 
with the content round square can somehow be individuated in a way that can be 
traced to the external world. This will be done based on states that have been 
individuated with regard to elements in the external world, perhaps beliefs about 
squares and about roundness. The content still gets to be the content it is because of 
elements in the world external to an individual’s body. Likewise, my desire to see a 
unicorn might be individuated based on beliefs about horns and horses.  
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The weak externalist system could be filled out in a number of different ways. 
To see how this might be accomplished, consider Macdonald’s position on act-types. 
She believes that action has to be individuated with regard to objects and so forth in 
the environment, and that the explanatory role of mental content is to rationalise 
action. As such she believes that one needs to taxonomise mental content widely in at 
least some cases. The very existence of contentful mental states depends on the 
existence of directly widely individuated mental states. Before considering 
Macdonald’s position in greater depth, it is advantageous to explain some 
terminology of weak externalism. Certain content—that which only weakly depends 
on elements in the external environment for its individuation—can in fact be called 
“narrow content”. It is “narrow” only in a limited sense of the term: this narrow 
content is directly dependent on other, wide content, and as such indirectly dependent 
on elements in the external environment.   
Consider Macdonald’s example of washing. Washing, for her, is a narrow act 
type while washing in water is a wide act type, which has to be individuated with 
regard to water. Washing does not have to be directly individuated based on anything 
in the external world, but only makes sense in the context of actions such as washing 
in water and washing in other substances.42 Essentially, for Macdonald, we are 
embodied creatures and our mental states have to be characterised in terms of action. 
The way we interact with the world shows what types of mental states we have. She 
holds that actions have to be individuated with regard to successful actions; after all 
an unsuccessful washing is not really a washing at all. For there to be successful 
                                                
42 Macdonald, Cynthia, “Externalism and Norms” in Antony O’hear (ed.) Current Issues in 
the Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge University Press: 1998, p. 289.  
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actions, there must be successful actions involving real interaction with elements in 
the external world. A successful washing will involving washing in something, for 
example water. A thought about washing will thus have to be individuatively 
connected to actual, successful washing in something. When one is thinking about 
washing there is narrow and wide content involved. One can be thinking only about 
the narrow act of washing, but this makes sense only in the context of particular 
instances of washing that will be washing in a substance. As such there is narrow 
content, in the loose sense of the term available to weak externalists.  
Let us turn to an example that will help to give a richer understanding of 
individuation for weak externalists. This example also highlights features specific to 
McGinn’s account. Recall Percy (from Section 3.1), who, when he is looking at 
something round, has an experience that has the same phenomenology as that of an 
earthling who is looking at something square. McGinn agrees with the internalist that 
as far as the phenomenal aspect of perceptual experience is concerned, 
phenomenology cannot come apart from content. Whatever the situation in the 
external environment, the content must be individuated along with phenomenology. 
However, weak externalist accounts allow that this does not mean that states with 
qualitative content are individuated narrowly. In this case, McGinn argues that 
Percy’s experience is individuated by the kind square. McGinn, like Macdonald, 
relies on the relationship between mental content and action to argue for weak 
externalism. 43  
                                                
43 See McGinn, 1989, circa  p. 70 for more detail on McGinn’s view. 
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Imagine that Percy is in a room with a large circle painted on the floor. If he 
decides to walk in a path around the circle, he will move in the shape of a square 
around it—that is, he will move “squarewise”—because he has an experience as of 
squareness. Using an example such as this, McGinn thinks he can show that Percy’s 
perceptual experience is individuated with respect to the kind square. McGinn holds 
that the content of perception supervenes on bodily states, including behaviour. He 
thinks that the content of Percy’s perceptual experiences supervenes on his behaviour, 
and that his behaviour has to be individuated with regard to the kind square. His 
behaviour is essentially “squarewise”: it is the kind of behaviour which is appropriate 
when dealing with square objects. The behaviour is in fact individuated as a 
squarewise one because of this connection to the kind square. Since Percy’s 
perceptual experience supervenes on his behaviour, it also would not be the 
perceptual experience that it is without the kind square. Thus Percy’s perceptual 
experience is weakly external because it is individuated with regard to the kind 
square, through its connection with action. McGinn claims that this point generalises. 
Other perceptual experiences also supervene on behaviours, and these behaviours are 
ones that are appropriate when dealing with certain kinds. These kinds are not entities 
that exist within an individual, so McGinn’s is an externalist position. It is only 
weakly externalist. The property of squareness, or any other property, does not have 
to be instantiated in the perceiver’s environment and does not have to have any causal 
link to the perceiver. As can be seen, this is similar to Macdonald’s argument, though 
she does not speak of content supervening on behaviour. In both cases, actions are 
relevant to the individuation of mental states, and actions require individuation with 
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regard to elements not found within in an individual, be they instantiated in the 
individual’s environment or otherwise. 
It should be noted that a difference between McGinn and Macdonald arises 
concerning the commitments made by an externalist. McGinn believes that the 
(strong) externalist view about a particular state commits one to the view that 
externalistically individuated contents are ones that one comes to have based on 
causal contact with elements in the external environment. However, Macdonald does 
not make such a commitment. She suggests that a thought about numbers, say my 
belief that two plus two equals four, is an example of a mental state which may be 
individuation-dependent on factors in the external world, even though it may be that 
the factors are abstract, and thus not part of the causal order.44 Yet as we have seen, 
for both of them, an individual does not need to have any causal link to something 
that individuates one of that individual’s narrow mental states. For both Macdonald 
and McGinn, these states are indirectly individuated with regard not to anything 
within an individual’s body, but rather to abstract types. For example, an experience 
as of squareness is as of squareness not because of anything within an individual’s 
body or environment, but because of the abstract kind square. However, for 
Macdonald, although the kinds are abstract, in general the relation between content 
and the world is effected through instances of the kinds. The internalist/externalist 
issue is not a simple dichotomy of individuating elements being either abstract kinds 
or things in the environment. 
                                                
44 Macdonald, Cynthia, personal correspondence, 26th June 2006. 
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Weak externalism accords with intuition to some degree. The view saves the 
externalist from having to point to something in the external environment that directly 
individuates a mental state, in this case because abstract kinds are used for 
individuation. On a weak externalist account I do not have to accept that my thought 
about a round square is individuated directly by anything in the external environment, 
nor do I have to accept this about the experience as of greenness or pain. However, a 
few concerns should be pointed out. Neither Macdonald’s nor McGinn’s view 
accords well with the brain-in-a-vat intuition, and this could be considered 
disadvantageous as compared with internalism. The intuition holds that we could 
have the same types of mental states we do now if we were brains floating in vats in 
otherwise empty worlds. Macdonald does not believe that this is possible as she 
believes that (at least the majority of) mental states are individuated by elements 
actually instantiated in the external world, though not always directly. McGinn’s 
system might seem to accord better with the brain in a vat intuition. The kinds that 
matter for individuation need not be instantiated in an individual’s environment, so 
changing what is instantiated in the environment seems not to make an individuative 
difference to mental states. However, McGinn relies on actions that depend on 
abstract types. If these abstract types were different, then the mental states of an 
individual would be different as well. Thus changing an element of the world external 
to an individual’s brain, body or mind (in the form of changing these abstract types) 
nonetheless makes an individuative difference to the content of that individual’s 
mental states. To that extent, the brain-in-the-vat intuition is not satisfied. It seems 
that the objects involved in the individuation of actions must be instantiated. 
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However, weak externalists can fare better in the case of the inverted earth intuition. 
When my twin with the inverting lenses looks at red grass on inverted earth, her 
mental states are not directly individuated by this red grass. Thus, depending on the 
account one gives, she might have an experience as of greenness. (She will act as 
though she is in the presence of green grass, so explanations of individuation 
involving action are well positioned to satisfy this intuition.) 
Because a weak externalist view admits of some content that is not directly 
individuated by something in the external world, it is less of an affront to our 
intuitions than strong externalism. For the weak externalist, it makes sense that for 
some content it is not immediately obvious how the elements of the external world 
matter for individuation. It is possible to say that states with qualitative content are in 
fact some of these weakly external states. They could simply depend for their 
individuation on wide states such as certain propositional attitudes or physical states 
of perception. They could even be individuated by their narrow functional role, i.e. 
the way they interact with other mental states, allowing a form of functionalism. This 
would be very like the position Rey maintains, except that it is weakly externalist 
rather than internalist. Both Rey and someone holding such a weak externalist 
position maintain that certain mental states are individuated by their narrow 
functional role, and in both scenarios there are other mental states that are not 
individuated in this way. The difference is merely that Rey does not claim that the 
individuation of the contents of states has to be grounded in elements in the external 
world. The weak externalist believes that the individuation of these apparently narrow 
mental states actually depends in some way on the external world via the states that 
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they interact with. Rey does not think that there is such an individuative dependence. 
This shows why such a position is an important recourse for someone rejecting Rey’s 
view.  
Conclusion 
Examining these positions has provided the background necessary for an 
analysis of Rey’s view. Internalism appears to be well motivated, but it is clear that 
Rey’s version is not the only version of internalism available, and that the position 
must be judged on its own merits rather than on the merits of the intuitions that 
support it. Moreover, there are a number of externalist positions that are to some 
degree able to address the reasons one might accept internalism. Weak externalism in 
particular is an interesting possibility, and a version of this view transpires to be very 
similar to Rey’s own view. The following chapter examines the problems with Rey’s 
view, and addresses a weak externalist compromise, which is able to achieve many of 
the goals of Rey’s endeavour.  
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Chapter 4: Rey’s Account Assessed and Adapted 
This chapter will assess the viability of Rey’s account. First it will examine 
whether it is possible to be representationalist about states with qualitative content 
given eliminativism about phenomenal properties. This examination will consider the 
analogy Rey uses to defend this possibility, and look at an argument that Joe Levine 
makes against Rey on the grounds that his view is unable to account for the 
substantiality and determinacy of qualitative content. These considerations will show 
that it is not in fact viable to be a fictionalist eliminativist about states with qualitative 
content. I will then propose an alternative account, which attempts to salvage Rey’s 
project. This account is intended to be a representationalist internalism along Rey’s 
lines, excepting that it abandons eliminativism. However, I conclude that this account 
is not viable as a strictly internalist account, and a weak externalist compromise must 
be made. Despite this, by adopting this account, Rey can challenge the standard 
representationalist externalist account, and show that mental states do not need to be 
individuated by some element in the external world that they represent.  
4.1 Mickey Mouse Revisited 
Rey’s argument for eliminativist representationalism relies heavily on a 
metaphor with fiction. Specifically, he speaks of someone attending a Mickey Mouse 
movie and the representations that individual has. He hopes to use this metaphor to 
show that it is possible to be both a representationalist with regard to qualitative 
content and an eliminativist with regard to phenomenal properties. However, I will 
show that there is a significant disanalogy between this case and the case of mental 
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states with qualitative content and the representational content that they have. This 
section explores this disanalogy and the effect it has on Rey’s argument, as well as 
examining another case to explore whether it is in fact a better analogy. It happens 
that in both cases there are external factors that seem relevant to the state’s ability to 
represent and so to its individuation. Rey needs a case analogous to that in which the 
content of a state arises out of its narrow functional role. However, neither of the two 
cases that I consider seems to be analogous with this. Instead, it seems that what these 
states represent is relevant to their having the content they do, and that this concerns 
factors external to the mind, brain and body. 
As we saw in Chapter 2, Rey uses an analogy with watching a Mickey Mouse 
movie to show that states that do not represent anything real can actually be 
representations nonetheless. However, a little analysis of this case reveals that it is 
unlike the case of narrow qualitative content. It does not seem to support the idea of 
representational content in the relevant case, where content is supposed to arise out of 
narrow functional role alone. Rey argues that regardless of whether the images on a 
movie screen represent anything real, they have significance for a viewer. People with 
no knowledge of the nature of movies will in fact mistake the represented mice and so 
forth for real things, which, according to Rey, shows that seeing them is in an 
important sense the same for the viewer as seeing something real. The significance 
does not arise from the real Mickey or any such thing, because there is no real 
Mickey. Likewise, our narrow mental states do not actually represent anything real, 
but nonetheless represent and have the same type of significance for us as states that 
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represent real things. In both cases it seems there is real representational content, but 
nothing real represented. 
However, this case and the case of qualitative content are only superficially 
alike. In the case of the movie, while the individual in question has not had prior 
experience with movies, he presumably can appeal to other representations, 
representations of real things, to give content to the representations he has while 
watching the movie. It is hard to imagine someone who does not have prior 
experience of worldly elements, such as mice, sentient creatures and language, 
understanding very much of a Mickey Mouse movie. The normal viewer will 
recognise Mickey as a mouse, or at least as an animate creature, and many of the 
other images and situations, presumably at least in part because of contact with mice 
or other animate beings. A viewer has real, contentful representations of Mickey 
Mouse because they are grounded in representations of real things: such 
representations are possible only in virtue of other representations that represent real 
things. However, there is nothing corresponding to this on Rey’s account to help 
make qualitative content genuinely representational. From an internalist perspective, 
the context given by elements in the external world cannot be involved in giving a 
state qualitative content or significance. Whereas in the movie case we can give an 
alternative explanation for the origin of representational content, in the case of 
qualitative content we cannot. Here it is a case of content arising out of narrow 
functional role alone. 
A more pertinent example to consider might be an analogy between mental 
states and language. Rey’s account is, after all, a language of thought account, and the 
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way words come to have meaning in natural language seems relevant. In particular, 
consider a possible analogy between a representational state and a nonsense phrase 
such as those found in Lewis Carroll’s “Jabberwocky”.45 This case could perhaps 
provide an explanation of how representation is able to come about when nothing is 
represented. The nonsense words in “Jabberwocky” have significance in some sense. 
Moreover, they appear to be the correct type of syntactic elements to represent, just as 
mental states are. Along the lines of Donald Davidson, I see no reason to think that 
there is any special sort of “metaphorical meaning” in such a case.46 There is nothing 
to make this sort of metaphorical use of language different from literal ones in terms 
of how it comes to be contentful. However, we must ask whether the significance of 
the nonsense words and phrases in “Jabberwocky” depends in some way on genuine 
representation. It is hard to believe that the words “brillig”, “slithy” and “toves” 
actually represent anything, and it is certainly not clear what they represent. 
Moreover, even if they do represent, it seems that the most convincing explanation 
for this is in fact an externalist one, ruining the analogy for Rey. The way the words 
sound reminds us of other words that represent elements of the world. “Slithy”, for 
example, is reminiscent of the words “slimy”, “slyly” and perhaps “swarthy”. Here, 
without any represented elements to turn to, we use other elements of language, 
which do represent something real, to account for representation. Representation 
within a context appears to depend on an external context. 
                                                
45 Macdonald, personal correspondence, 26th June 2006. 
46 Davidson, Donald. “What Metaphors Mean”, Critical Inquiry, Vol. 5, No. 1, Special Issue 
on Metaphor (Autumn, 1978) 31-47. 
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The “Jabberwocky” case is thus no better than the Mickey Mouse case. The 
words (such as “slimy” and “slyly”) that help give the nonsense words in 
“Jabberwocky” any representational content they have presumably get their content 
from those things that they represent. Instead of helping to show how syntactical 
items such as words or mental states can come to have representational content on a 
narrow functionalist account, the “Jabberwocky” analogy instead suggests how 
difficult such a task is. Most plausibly, it seems that if the nonsense words and 
phrases in the “Jabberwocky” represent anything at all, their powers of representation 
originate from connections with representations that do represent real things, and, it is 
reasonable to say, get what content they have from them. 
In the Mickey Mouse case we can admit the existence of representation, but 
only in relation to contents of other representations that represent something real. In 
the Jabberwocky case, if representation is occurring, much the same is true. Looking 
at these cases suggests that if they are analogous to the case of qualitative content, 
then Rey’s view is incorrect. Rey cannot use this analogy to show that there is 
ontological room for representational content that does not represent anything real, 
nor, by extension, to show that there is narrow representational content of the type 
Rey describes. However, qualitative content might be unlike either movie images or 
nonsense words. I turn to another argument to show more conclusively why 
representationalism and eliminativism are ill-suited to each other.  
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4.2 Levine’s Concerns About Rey’s View 
Rey’s narrow representationalism is problematic because of his eliminativism. 
As Section 4.1 shows, Rey’s analogy with a movie does not help to show that there 
can be states with representational content that do not represent anything real, unless 
this content depends on an external context. Levine provides an explicit argument that 
shows that representational content in the case of qualitative states has to be grounded 
in something real. He believes that such states could not otherwise come to have 
qualitative content of the determinate, substantial kind that they do. The argument pits 
Rey’s representationalism against his eliminativism, in such a way as to make them 
incompatible. 
Levine is concerned with the nature of qualitative content. He claims that “the 
determinacy and the substantiality of our conception of qualitative content” reveals 
something that Rey’s position cannot account for.47 Qualitative content does have 
significance for us and we are able to note certain things about it. This seems to be the 
case despite Rey’s claim that phenomenal properties such as reddishness and 
painfulness do not exist. Levine thinks that certain aspects of this significance will be 
hard for an eliminativist to explain. Consider the way in which the experience as of 
redness differs from the experience as of orangeness, and how this is different from 
the way in which it differs from the experience of blueness and further different from 
they way in which it differs from the experience of high-pitchedness. Rey takes all of 
these experiences to represent fictional phenomenal properties. However, if there are 
no real properties such as reddishness and the like for these experiences to represent, 
                                                
47 Levine, Joseph. Purple Haze: the Puzzle of Consciousness, Oxford University Press: 2004. 
p. 146. 
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it is hard to explain the obvious differences between these experiences. The situation 
is best and most easily understood as involving differences in phenomenal properties. 
Specifically, Levine discusses the issue of “determinacy”, by which he is referring to 
the relations that seem to exist between different phenomenal properties, such as the 
determinate-determinable relations, and that are hard to explain if phenomenal 
properties do not exist.48 For example, it seems to us that reddishness is a type of 
colouredishness and maroonishness is a type of reddishness.  
On Rey’s account, the differences between states having different contents is 
accounted for in terms of differences in the representations themselves, rather than in 
terms of what is being represented. As we saw in Chapter 2, for Rey it is the 
functional role of a state within our mental processing systems that individuates 
mental states. However, it is much simpler to say that it seems to us that reddishness 
is a type of colouredishness because it is in fact true that reddishness is a type of 
colouredishness, rather than because of the functional role of the experiences as of 
redness and as of colour. (Or alternatively, it might be plausible to explain this with 
reference to redness and colour.) As such, it seems desirable to explain the 
determinate-determinable relations of our notions of the phenomenal by reference to 
what is represented, rather than the representation itself. It is in fact hard to see how 
these relations can be accounted for at all just by reference to differences in 
representations themselves. After all, they are just items defined by their narrow 
functional role. As we have seen, on Rey’s account the states have different content 
given that they have different relations to other mental states and perform different 
                                                
 48 Levine, p. 146. 
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functional roles. These kinds of differences, concerning the representation and not 
what is represented, do not seem to be the right place to look for what accounts for 
either the determinacy or the more general substantiality of our notions of 
reddishness, painfulness and the like.  
Levine argues that Rey’s view faces a dilemma. Rey can hold either that the 
functional roles of states can adequately account for the determinacy and 
substantiality of qualitative content, or that it cannot. Both options lead to difficulties 
for Rey. Consider the possibility that functional roles do offer an appropriate account. 
On this account, the fact that there appear to be phenomenal properties is problematic. 
Everything we want to posit about qualitative content would already be made possible 
by the states themselves without our needing to believe that there are phenomenal 
properties. The fact that an experience as of redness feels a certain way is accounted 
for by the functional role of the mental state, which determines the content, and is 
done so without reference to any property of reddishness. Rey gives an account of our 
representational states and how they are individuated without making use of any 
phenomenal properties. However, he then feels the need to somehow address the 
issue of why we think there are phenomenal properties, which he does through the 
use of his fictionalist eliminativism. Levine believes that Rey must take this extra step 
and account for the apparent existence of phenomenal properties because of the 
substantiality and determinacy of qualitative content. However, Levine responds that 
“if characteristic processing…captures what seems present to us in our experience of 
reddishness, then why bother with the fictionalism?”49 Essentially, if this were the 
                                                
49 Ibid., p. 149. 
78 
case, there would be no need to explain why we believe that phenomenal properties 
exist by introducing fictionalism. All the significance of our narrow mental states 
would be accounted for by representational properties individuated by their functional 
role. However, we do (or at least Rey claims we do) think that phenomenal properties 
exist. Levine suggests that this is virtually an admission from Rey that the functional 
role account does not address certain aspects of qualitative content sufficiently. 
Recognising this possibility is to embrace the other horn of the dilemma: Rey 
could argue that functional role cannot account for determinacy and substantiality of 
phenomenal content. However, then he must be able to argue that something else 
actually is able to account for the determinacy and substantiality, and nothing in his 
account is able to do that. Rey cannot say that phenomenal properties are involved in 
accounting for the determinacy and substantiality of qualitative content, because they 
do not exist. His fictionalist position places emphasis on the fact that it seems to us 
that phenomenal properties do exist. One might think that the fact that we believe 
there to be phenomenal properties could account for substantiality and determinacy. 
Yet this is not a viable option. It seems that these beliefs actually need explaining, 
and cannot be used in an explanation. Levine thus points out a major flaw in Rey’s 
account. Regardless of what can be said about the functional roles of these states, it 
still seems that Rey is expecting qualitative content to exist in a vacuum, lacking 
external context or anything else real to ground them.  However, this is a strange 
position to hold about content, especially representational content. The above 
considerations show that content must come from somewhere other than mere narrow 
functional roles. 
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4.3 Internalism and Phenomenal Properties  
Someone wanting to adapt Rey’s view so that it can withstand Levine’s 
objection must find something beyond mere functional role as Rey defines it to use to 
individuate these states, presumably finding something real for representations of 
phenomenal properties to represent. For an internalist, the natural recourse is the 
possibility that phenomenal properties actually exist and are located internally to an 
individual. The determinacy and substantiality of qualitative content could come from 
these phenomenal properties. Such an internalist could then hold that representations 
with qualitative content actually represent phenomenal properties. I will examine this 
possibility in this section, and how it can be combined with elements of Rey’s view. 
It should be noted that Levine’s objection does not show that phenomenal 
properties have to exist, only that there must be some real properties relevant to the 
individuation of states with qualitative content beyond those of merely having a 
certain functional role, and that these properties will be concerned with 
representation. In the externalist case it is especially clear that phenomenal properties 
do not have to exist. An externalist representationalist will hold that states with 
qualitative content actually represent elements of the external world and obtain their 
content from these. This can occur without any phenomenal properties. Tye, for 
example, holds a direct representationalist position that does not involve any 
phenomenal properties, as has been explored above. However, at least for an 
internalist, accepting phenomenal properties seems to be well motivated. 
Faced with Levine’s challenge, an internalist must identify something internal 
to an individual that could account for the determinacy and substantiality of 
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qualitative content. Phenomenal properties are a natural recourse: they are, after all, 
concerned with the qualitative content of perceptual experiences and phenomenal 
states. These properties may or may not be of a distinct, non-reducible kind. States 
with qualitative content could represent them, and they could be used to explain the 
determinacy and substantiality of qualitative content. However, claiming that 
phenomenal properties exist shifts the burden of explaining these aspects of the nature 
of qualitative content. Instead of making inquiries into such content, we are left to 
make inquiries into phenomenal properties. It may be the case that nothing more can 
be said about phenomenal properties than that they exist brutely and give content to 
certain mental states. Yet unless something more can be said about them, proposing 
their existence as a solution to this problem is simply a place-holder for an 
explanation about what makes phenomenal content phenomenal content. Therefore, 
investigating the nature of phenomenal properties is necessary. 
To an extent it is natural for an internalist to embrace phenomenal properties. 
While Rey tries to be an eliminativist internalist, his position, not that of a non-
eliminativist internalist, is unusual. The belief in phenomenal properties coheres with 
the internalist brain-in-a-vat intuition. Recall the importance Horgan et al. place on 
phenomenology, as discussed in Chapter 3. For them, qualitative (or as they call it, 
“phenomenal”) content is narrow and fundamental to all mental states. They make a 
number of claims about phenomenology and qualitative content, arguing on the basis 
of the brain-in-the-vat hypothesis that they are narrow. For internalists who do not 
deflate phenomenology in the way Rey does, it is natural to accept the existence of 
phenomenal properties. This can explain why states have the phenomenology they do 
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without having to resort to externalism. For someone who appeals to an argument 
such as the brain-in-a-vat thought experiment, much of the attraction is concerned 
with phenomenology. Many think it is a genuine epistemic possibility that I am 
currently a brain in a vat. This implies the belief that it would feel the same for me if I 
were a brain in a vat, i.e. that it would be phenomenologically identical for me if I 
were. As such, it is the phenomenology that seems most central to the non-
eliminativist internalist position. Assuming that the existence of phenomenal 
properties is the most reasonable way to expound on this focus on phenomenology, it 
is natural for an internalist to accept them. 
It may be possible to naturalise phenomenal properties while remaining fairly 
close to Rey’s intent. One is not forced to accept that they are non-physical 
properties. A functionalist account of phenomenal properties would cohere well with 
the bulk of Rey’s account, as his is a functional role account of individuation. As has 
been stated, he maintains that the qualitative content of mental states is individuated 
with respect to the role these states play in mental processing. This same general 
means of explaining the individuation of mental states can be used in a scheme that 
involves phenomenal properties. As mentioned in Chapter 2, for Rey, perceptual 
experiences such as the experience as of redness are typically caused by certain 
proximal stimulus conditions, in this case states of perceiving redness, and will lead 
to other states due to sensory processing, such as, perhaps, the experience as of warm-
colouredness. These same states can be used to explain the nature of qualitative 
content in a theory of phenomenal properties.  
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The linchpin of an account combining a functionalist view such as Rey’s with 
a view involving phenomenal properties is the nature of phenomenal properties. Here 
I explore the possibility that phenomenal properties are a type of property had by 
states with qualitative content in virtue of the causal relations they are apt to bear to 
other mental states, i.e. in virtue of their functional roles. Phenomenal properties can 
be used to explain determinacy and substantiality, and the individuation of mental 
states would remain intimately connected to their functional role within mental 
processing.  
On the proposed view, states with qualitative content themselves have 
phenomenal properties. The states are individuated just as they are on Rey’s original 
account, in virtue of the functional role they play in mental processing. However, in 
virtue of the relations they hold to other states (in the case of reddishness, these may 
include the perceptual states concerned with perceiving redness and also the states 
that are caused by this, perhaps such as the experience of warm-colouredness), the 
states also have phenomenal properties. I sketch this view here and explore it more 
thoroughly in the following paragraphs. These properties, for example the reddishness 
of an experience as of redness, inhere in the states with qualitative content. However, 
they are not a special type of hard to naturalise, non-physical property.  Instead, they 
are a type of functionally defined property had by states in virtue of the properties of 
the states it is apt to be caused by and apt to cause. The fact that phenomenal 
properties actually exist and are possessed by states with qualitative content explains 
how these states can be substantive in the way they are. It also provides space for an 
explanation of the determinacy of qualitative content. Phenomenal properties are real 
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properties that stand in determinate/determinable relationships to each other. The 
experiences that represent these properties reflect these determinate/determinable 
relationships. 
Consider the experience as of redness. On the suggested account, as on Rey’s 
unmodified account, this experience is typically caused by perceptions of redness and 
is apt to cause other states such as the experience as of warm-colouredness. 
Expanding Rey’s view, one might also think that such a state is apt to cause certain 
propositional attitudes such as the belief that one is in the presence of a round, red 
object. On the new, modified model that introduces phenomenal properties, 
phenomenal properties are relevant to the individuation of states with qualitative 
content. Yet the fact that these states have the phenomenal properties they do, such as 
the experience as of redness being reddish, is due to causal relations that these states 
are apt to bear to those other states, the perception of redness, experience as of warm-
colouredness, beliefs about redness and so forth. This is due to the fact that 
phenomenal properties are individuated functionally.  The reddishness of the 
experience as of redness is fixed by the properties of these other states to which that 
experience is apt to bear causal relations. The perception of redness and beliefs 
concerning redness have the property of representing redness. The experience as of 
redness has the content it does because it represents reddishness, and that property is 
individuated by properties of the states to which that experience is apt to bear causal 
relations, such as the property of being a perception of red, and the property of being 
an experience as of warm-colouredness—properties that the states that the reddish 
experience is apt to bear causal relations to have because of what those states 
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represent. However, instead of having redness as its content, this experience has 
reddishness as its content. 
The need for such a state to represent a property other than redness is 
demonstrated by the inverted earth experiment and other motivations for internalism. 
We can have a state representing reddishness while having no states that in fact 
represent redness; the experience as of redness can come apart from states actually 
representing redness. In such a circumstance the standard relationships held between 
experiences as of redness, perceptions of redness and the like become disturbed. As 
such, states with qualitative content have the content they do in a way that connects to 
what they represent, the experience as of redness is a reddish experience by virtue of 
representing reddishness, but depends on other states and their properties. 
This alternative preserves representationalist internalism. It sacrifices a large 
element of Rey’s view, but the proposed modified view does work to achieve Rey’s 
aim of showing that our mental states do not need to be individuated with regard to 
elements of the external world that they represent. It may seem odd that the 
experience as of redness represents reddishness but also is reddish, i.e., it represents a 
property that it has. However, it is by representing the property of reddishness that it 
comes to instantiate this property. (It does not actually represent an aspect of itself, 
instead it instantiates the property it represents: what it represents is a type, and its 
instantiation is a token.) Such a position seems to have what is required for a 
coherent, consistent, and plausible representationalist internalist functionalist view. 
However, certain objections can be made to it, and the question of whether Rey’s 
project could be deemed a success needs to be further considered. 
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4.4 The Weak Externalist Challenge 
The possibility considered above is an attempt to modify Rey’s account by 
introducing phenomenal properties in order to explain the determinacy and 
substantiality of qualitative content. However, even if one is able to find a viable 
home for phenomenal properties in such a modified version of Rey’s account, this 
does not show that the view can adequately explain the determinacy and substantiality 
of qualitative content in an internalist way. Rey’s account and the modified view both 
involve functional individuation of mental states with qualitative content. The states 
involved in the functional relations on which individuation depends can pose a threat 
to internalism. If there is sufficient reason to believe that the states involved in 
individuating functional relations have to be individuated widely, whether in a weak 
or strong externalist way, this may have externalist ramifications for states with 
qualitative content. In this section, I argue that states with qualitative content are in 
fact weakly externalist, because states involved in their individuation are themselves 
externalistically individuated. However, I further argue that while accepting this 
account would be a considerable compromise for Rey, and that it fails to accord with 
a number of our internalist intuitions, on such an account there is nonetheless a 
significant sense in which states with qualitative content are narrow. Rey’s aims are 
satisfied to a degree by this indirect dependence on factors in the external world in a 
way they would not be satisfied by direct dependence. States with qualitative content 
are not individuated in a directly externalist way, and moreover they do not represent 
any element in the external world, a fortiori do not get their content from that 
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represented element. As such, the modified version of Rey’s view presents a 
significant challenge to the externalist representationalist view. 
One might argue that the possibilities available to Rey introduce weak 
externalism. Rey’s hope to the contrary is that states with qualitative content can be 
individuated with regard to their functional role as defined narrowly. However, if my 
experience as of redness is an experience as of redness (in part) because it is apt to be 
caused by a certain state of sensory perception that is individuation-dependent in 
some way on actual redness in the world, then my experience as of redness is then 
also individuation-dependent on actual redness in the world. Assuming that this and 
other such states are weakly or strongly externally individuated, then a change in the 
environment will change the nature of the qualitative content of the mental states an 
individual has. This is not a mere causal difference but an individuative one. If the 
sensory perception of redness depends for its individuation on actual redness, in a 
world such that there is not (and never has been) real redness, a perceptual state 
physically identical to my perception of redness would be individuated differently. 
This would in turn be apt to cause an experience that is individuation-dependent on 
this perceptual state for individuation to have different content; one could presumably 
not even have an experience as of redness. If this sensory perception of redness were 
individuated in a weakly external way, the same would be true. As Rey is attempting 
to develop and defend a narrow representationalism, it seems, at least at first, deeply 
problematic for him if weak externalism enters the account, and a case can be made 
that these individuating states do in fact require some degree of externalist 
individuation themselves. 
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There are two ways to defend internalism from the above possibility. One 
could argue that all of the states involved in any way with the individuation of 
qualitative content are in fact narrow. Alternatively, one could attempt to argue that 
despite involving states that are individuated with regard to elements in the external 
world, an account such as the one given above in fact achieves the goals Rey has for a 
narrow content representationalist account, and that with such a view Rey still 
challenges the externalist representationalist viewpoint. 
I will first address the possibility of avoiding externalism altogether, by 
addressing Rey’s unmodified position, and then expanding this to the proposed model 
that does involve phenomenal properties. On the eliminativist model, Rey hopes to 
limit the states relevant to the individuation of states with qualitative content to those 
located within specific limited subsections of the brain (modules), individuating these 
states along narrow functionalist lines.50 States involved in sensory perception, such 
as the perception of redness and further experiential states, such as the experience as 
of warm-colouredness, are included in this sensory module. (Note, however, that Rey 
does not consider propositional attitudes to be relevant to the individuation of 
qualitative content. Thus these do not have to be narrow for his account of qualitative 
content to be narrow.) It must be examined whether these states involved in the 
individuation of states with qualitative content can in fact be narrow. The idea that 
perceptual experiences can be narrow is already under consideration in Rey’s inquiry. 
As such, perceptual experiences involved in the individuation of other perceptual 
experiences pose no particular threat to internalism. An internalist functionalist 
                                                
50 Rey, 1998, p. 451.  While there is more to a definition of modularity than has been given 
here, it is unnecessary for the points at hand. 
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account can also plausibly be given for states involved in the sensory process such as 
the perception of redness. This account will be in terms of states involved in causal 
processes such as those involved in seeing, perhaps starting with stimulation of the 
cornea. These states will be causally dependent on elements of the external world, 
but, Rey can maintain, not individuatively dependent on those elements.  
It seems to be a viable option to be an internalist about the states that are 
supposed to individuate qualitative content on Rey’s unmodified account, excepting, 
of course, the problem Levine identifies. However, the same may not be the case 
when one introduces phenomenal properties in response to Levine’s objection. 
Introducing phenomenal properties provides a place to look for an explanation of the 
determinacy and substantiality of qualitative content. However, merely introducing 
phenomenal properties does not comprise the entirety of such an explanation. The 
nature of phenomenal properties is essential to such an account. On the possibility 
proposed above, phenomenal properties are properties of a state with qualitative 
content that they have in virtue of the relations it holds with other states and their 
properties. Phenomenal properties arise out of narrow functional relations. We must 
explore whether or not the states that individuate states with qualitative content are 
able to account for phenomenal properties that, in turn, are able to account for the 
substantiality and determinacy of qualitative content. Rey’s unmodified view is 
problematic as he expects qualitative content to exist in a vacuum, devoid of anything 
to give it substantiality and determinacy. However, introducing functionally defined 
phenomenal properties does not necessarily help to fill this vacuum. On such an 
account, properties such as reddishness and colouredishness actually exist. However, 
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they are merely different properties arising out of states having different functional 
roles. The relationship between these properties is as mysterious as the perceived 
relationship between them on an account where they do not in fact exist. An 
explanation of substantiality and determinacy is not given, and there does not seem to 
be a place even to look for one on such an account. The alternative, however, is a 
weak externalist one: that genuine properties in the external world make it possible 
for substantial, determinate qualitative content to exist, either directly or indirectly. 
On such an account reddishness would seem to be a type of colouredishness because 
redness is in fact a type of colouredness. Given this problem, one could choose to 
reject the functionalist account of phenomenal properties, and perhaps introduce some 
ontologically distinct, irreducible phenomenal property. Alternatively, one could 
accept a version of weak externalism. To remain as close to Rey’s intent as possible, 
and to leave some room for qualitative content to be in a limited sense narrow, the 
best possibility is that qualitative content continues to be individuated along 
functionalist lines, and it is merely relations to other mental states or to phenomenal 
properties that makes qualitative content substantial and determinate. Adopting this 
view is a large compromise, and a version of weak externalism.  
Let us turn to the second way to respond to the accusation that the modified 
version of Rey’s view is prey to weak externalism. One can argue that regardless of 
whether states with qualitative content are individuated in a way that eventually 
depends on the environment, they are close enough to narrow to satisfy Rey. States 
with qualitative content are after all not individuated directly in terms of anything in 
the external world: instead they are individuated with regard to other mental states or 
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to phenomenal properties, which are something existing within an individual. Weak 
externalism apparently must enter the theory at some point, as has been argued above. 
The proposed modification illustrates how this could occur. However, the fact that 
weak externalism must enter the proposed modified account need not be devastating 
to Rey’s project. Weak externalism is actually a compromise between strong 
externalism and internalism. Weak externalists are in a sense warranted to call states 
that are individuated without any direct connection to the external world “narrow”. 
States with qualitative content can be narrow in this limited sense of the term.  
The question of whether Rey’s account succeeds becomes a question of 
whether narrow content in the limited sense available to a weak externalist is 
sufficient for Rey. This in turn depends on his motivations for internalism. From the 
perspective of someone who is hoping to satisfy various intuitions about content by 
being an internalist, this account does not succeed on the whole. However, Rey’s goal 
of demonstrating the possibility of a narrow content representationalism is fulfilled, 
depending on the understanding of narrow content. I will briefly turn to various 
intuitions that support internalism and then show in what way the modified version of 
Rey’s account can be thought of as a success. If he were attempting to create a theory 
that satisfies intuitions about internalism, his project does not succeed. However, I 
take him to be challenging accepted views on the relationship between externalism 
and representationalism, and in this he does succeed. 
A view that admits of weak externalism is incompatible with the brain-in-the-
vat intuition. The external environment does matter to the individuation of states with 
qualitative content. Even more strongly, for the weak externalist, in order for there to 
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be narrow content there must be contentful states with wide content. Thus a brain in a 
vat could not have narrow content mental states because it could not have wide 
content ones. Likewise, the internalist intuition about the inverted earth case does not 
apply in this modified version of Rey’s account that includes weak externalism. The 
effects of the external environment on the individuating states will prove problematic. 
The states relevant to individuating states with qualitative content will in fact be 
different. However, this account does leave one intuition satisfied: the intuition that 
what matters to individuating my states with qualitative content is something internal 
to me. If one is concerned that my mental states are somehow not present to me, but 
out in the external world, this fear is to a degree assuaged by the weak externalist. 
What matters for the individuation of my mental states is within me, but the external 
environment is nonetheless relevant. This modified version of Rey’s account thus 
coincides with intuition only in a very limited way.  
Yet Rey’s project, at least in A Narrow Representationalist Account of 
Qualitative Experience, is to show that there can be narrow representationalism. 
Externalist representationalists tend to assume that states must be individuated in 
terms of what they represent, and that those represented things must be elements in 
the external world. Rey argues instead that states with qualitative content are in fact 
individuated with respect to their functional role and do not have to represent 
anything real at all. The modified view that I propose for Rey does maintain that there 
are real phenomenal properties. However, these states are nonetheless in an important 
sense narrow. Weak externalism does enter the view, but states with qualitative 
content do not have the content they have due to elements they represent in the 
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external world, as externalist representationalists maintain. What matters for the 
individuation of states with qualitative content is located internally to an individual, 
though there are nonetheless individuative connections to the external world. The 
modified position diverges from Rey’s considerably, but does seem to show that there 
can be “narrow representationalism” in an important sense of the term. 
Conclusion 
If Rey were to choose to sacrifice his eliminativist view in response to 
Levine’s challenges, the natural view for him to adopt to preserve as much of the rest 
of his position as possible is the functionalist position explored above. However, this 
position appears to require weak externalism. It seems that a functionalist internalist 
type account of phenomenal properties is unsatisfying for the same reasons that an 
account without phenomenal properties is unsatisfying, unless the external world is 
somehow relevant to individuation. Unless it is, such an account provides no 
acceptable source for an answer as to the origins of the determinacy and substantiality 
of qualitative content. Yet including weak externalism into the account need not 
prove devastating for Rey. While the account fails to satisfy a number of internalist 
intuitions, it nonetheless is a case for narrow representationalism of a significant type. 
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